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ABSTRACT 
THA FERGHANA VALLEY AS A FACTOR OF INSTABILITY 
Sydykov, Aslan 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Jeremy Salt 
September 2000 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the huge territory of Central Asia turned to 
be one of the most conflict-ridden 1nd unstable areas in thr world. Several bloody 
uprisings have occurred and are occurring in the region, including some in the 
Ferghana Valley. This valley plays a crucial role in the economic, social and 
political life of three of five of the central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan. 
The pre-Soviet and Soviet legacy and the problems raised since the independence 
of these states makes me to determine several factors that directly influence on 
stability in the region. This thesis tries to show how these factors destabilise 
situation in the Ferghana Valley and the Central Asian region as a whole. 
Keywords: The Ferghana Valley, Central Asia, Instability, Conflict 
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OZET 
BiR iSTiKRARSIZLIK ETKENi OLARAK FERGANA V ADiSi 
Sydykov, Asian 
Yi.iksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilirni ve Kamu Yonetimi Boli.imi.i 
Tez Yoneticisi: Do~.Dr. Jeremy Salt 
Eyli.il 2000 
Sovyetler Birligi'nin y1kilmasmdan sonra Orta Asya'mn geni~ topraklan dtinyanm 
enyatl~mah ve istikrars1z bolgelerinden biri haline geldi. Fergana Vadisi'ndekileri 
de iyeren pek yok kanh ayaklanma meydana geldi ve hala da meydana gelmektedir. 
Bu vadi be~ Orta Asya devletinden ilyilniln ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi hayatmda 
yok onemli bir rol oynamakt1r. Bu devletler Kirg1zistan, Tac1kistan ve 
Ozbekistan'dir. 
Sovyet oncesi ve Sovyet doneminin miras1 ile bu devletlerin bag1ms1zhgmdan 
sonra ortaya y1kan problemler benim bolgenin istikranm dogrudan etkileyen baz1 
etkenleri belirlememe sebep oldu. Bu tez bu etkenlerin Fergana Vadisi ve genel 
olarak Orta Asya bolgesindeki durumu nasil istikrars1zla~tird1g1m gostermeye 
yah~amaktadir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Fergana Vadisi, Orta Asya, istikrars1zhk, yat1~ma 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Many experts think that the Central Asian region is one of the most conflict-ridden 
and unstable areas of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Several bloody uprisings have 
occurred recently in the region, including some in the F erghana Valley (see map) 1. 
This valley plays a crucial role in the economic, social and political life of three of five 
of the Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan. For the first 
time in its millennium-long history this small fertile overpopulated territory has been 
divided between independent states. Though the conflicts in the region are 
suppressed, the situation in the Valley makes it necessary to prepare different 
prognoses of development not only for these three republics but for the Central Asian 
region as a whole. 
There are some internal and external problems that can lead to serious conflicts in the 
region. These are not only ethnic, religious or ideological but also economical, 
political, social, criminal, and ecological. One can predict that these conflicts will take 
place on a large scale and will be more difficult to solve as the situation deteriorates 
and as political leaders fail to evolve real mechanisms ofresolution2. 
1 In the years prior to independence and soon afterwards, several bloody conflicts occurred in the 
Ferghana Valley, including clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek riots in Kyrgyzstan. Although they did not escalate into major regional 
confrontations, these conflicts demonstrated that ethnic tension in the region has reached a 
potentially explosive points. (Ta6h1wa.·rneBa. 2000). 
: Moreoyer. the region's state officials do not encourage the scholarly examination of these conflicts 
and conflict situation in the valley. (Ta6blwa.1neBa, 2000) 
The main problem for the region is the economy. The situation is complicated by a 
rapid growth of population that leads to strict competition for land, water and other 
resources. There is a high level of unemployment3 and scarce well-paid work 
especially between different ethnic groups. 
The establishment of international borders, the introduction of national currencies and 
different ways of economical reforms in its respective parts of Central Asia has 
complicated the situation in the historically integrated Ferghana Valley; one problem 
is how to preserve trade between interdependent parts of the valley after the 
establishment of many new customs barriers. Border control, corrupted customs, 
prohibition of barter and currency exchange problems are all further problems of life 
in the Valley. All these are the result of the policy of the central governments of 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which is aimed at strengthening the dependence of 
respective parts of the valley on the centre. 
Another serious problem in the region is the "black" (illegal) economy, which has 
been forming over decades. This is the main reason why corruption and organised 
crime are so widespread. Corruption of the state organs including police and courts 
probably is one of the reasons preventing successful democratic and economic 
reforms. But these problems are keener in the Ferghana Valley as it was and is the 
most corrupted area in the Central Asian region4; apart from official corruption the 
valley is a prime route for the smuggling of drugs. 
3 According to the survey conducted by Institute for Regional Studies unemployment is the main 
factor to destabilise situation in the valley (survey was conducted in the South Kyrgyzstan). 
l Ta6b1wa11Hesa; A.1IHwesa; illyicypos, 2000: 15) 
2 
The Soviet state formed in the region a wide network of social infrastructure covering 
general education, public health and so on, which the new independent states cannot 
maintain. As the result, in recent years, we see the sharp decline of education, health 
standards, the deterioration of the environment, an unequal distribution of resources 
between different ethnic groups and deterioration in the status of women5. All these 
tensions lead to instability in the region and especially in the Ferghana valley. 
Growing regionalism, the renaissance of Islam and politicisation of the notion of 
"nation" are all potential sources of increased conflict and possible mechanisms for 
conflicts to take place. 
Another problem for the Kyrgyz and Tajik parts of the Ferghana Valley is the 
presence of a huge number of refugees, which in its turn causes a deterioration in the 
economical situation in the Valley. Sometimes local people express their protest 
because the refugees live better as they receive help from humanitarian organisations 
(Ta6b1IIIrun1eaa; Am1IIIeaa; lllyK)'poa, 2000: 23). 
External factors play no a less role. Despite all attempts by regional governments to 
distance themselves economically, politically and culturally from Russia, this country 
is still important for the region, and especially for Ferghana where the Russian 
1 About corruption in the valley and Central Asia see Critchlow, James. 1991. .\'ationa/ism in 
r·zbekistan. San Fransisco: Westview Press: 39-57. 
5 About sharp decline of living standard in the valley see Nalle, David. 2000."The Ferghana Valley -
1999 A Personal Report" . Central Asia Monitor 1. 
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Federation is the only external state with a significant military force near the Valley. 
But Russia has no clear policy towards the region; some Russian policymakers are 
promoting a forward policy aimed at preventing conflict but other high officials 
openly claim that the continuing conflicts can serve Russian interests in the region6. 
The geographical proximity, rapid economic growth, huge internal market and 
absence of political barriers for trade makes the People's Republic of China another 
important player in the region. Moreover, the importance of China will grow if a 
project to build the rail- and highway from Europe and Middle East to China through 
the Ferghana Valley is realised. This project would create jobs and increase living 
standards in the Valley, but at the same time ethnic conflicts in the west of China 
(East Turkestan) where the Muslim Turkic ethnic groups live may complicate the 
situation. 
Iran and Turkey have not been able to become significant political and religious 
players in Central Asia though they have successfully developed economic relations 
with the region. Other states (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) as well as private Turkish 
religious institutions have become the main sponsors of Islamic activity in the region 
(Ta6bIIWUIH:eaa, 11 ). Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are important economic partners with 
the help of which the regional states want to reduce their dependence on the Russian 
infrastructure (for example, trade routes, gas and oil pipelines). All the above factors 
can threaten stability and peace in the region. 
"Solodovnik Sergey. 1993. "Stability in Central Asia and Versions of Russia's Strategy," Vostok (3) 
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The thesis consists of eight chapters including introduction and conclusion. The 
theoretical part of the thesis will include the notion of the term 'instability' in the 
context of late-developing states and is based on the possible mechanism of conflict 
and instability in the Ferghana Valley. I characterise Central Asian states as late 
developing with the specific characteristics of this model. These include the poor 
institutionalisation of state organs and a corresponding lack of legitimacy and 
capacity of the state to solve problems. The inability of the state to satisfy peoples' 
demands ends up with their activism. The weaker political institutionalisation is in 
relation to social mobilisation, the greater is the chance that the state will experience 
instability. In the Ferghana Valley factors such as economy, regionalism, religion and 
so on increase the level of social mobilisation. In other words these factors separately, 
together or in combination can destabilise the situation in the valley and in the region 
as a whole. 
I followed basically three methods in this research. Firstly I conducted a literature 
review concerning the Ferghana valley. Secondly I followed developments in the 
region investigating the periodicals published since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
especially in the last two years. Finally I conducted personal observation by visiting 
the region in 1998. This helped me to interpret the current political situation in the 
region. On the other hand it helped me to support my theoretical arguments through 
practical experience. 
In my thesis I want to show Central Asia as a huge zone of instability, one concrete 
example of which is the Ferghana Valley. The Ferghana Valley in all aspects is an 
5 
important part of Central Asia combining the Soviet legacy with specific local 
features. This territory is now becoming a zone of instability. Moreover the 
destabilisation of the situation in the valley challenges stability in post-Soviet Central 
Asia as a whole. Several bloody uprisings had already happened there just before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and currently fighting is going on between Islamist rebels 
and the Kyrgyz and Uzbek state military forces. I show in my thesis that all these 
factors which characterise the Ferghana Valley lead to instability and conflicts in the 
region. 
6 
CHAPTER II. INST ABILITY AND LATE-DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
The theoretical part of my thesis will be composed of two parts: first, what is meant 
by political instability and, second, one of the probable mechanisms of conflict. 
Instability is "the range of behaviour which is to be regarded as constituting 
'destabilising' political action"7. This behaviour is defined to include coup d'etat, 
attempted coups d'etat, acts of guerrilla warfare, riots, demonstrations, political 
strikes, deaths from political violence, assassinations, changes in the chief executive, 
and cabinet changes, together with changes in types of normative structure, changes 
in party system and change in civilian-military status8. 
D. Sanders agues that there are ~everal types of instability and since our unit of 
analysis is the 'political system', it makes sense to employ two of the conceptual 
dimensions of political systems: 'government' and 'regime'9. Then I suggest that the 
instability of governments or of regimes is manifested either in the form of changes in 
the government or regime, or in the form of challenges (violent or non-violent) to 
either the government or regime (see appendices, figure 1). 
In states with relatively low levels of institutionalisation which are evident within 
Central Asian states there is a general tendency for relatively mild forms of 
Sanders. Dm·id. l 981. Patterns of Political Instability. London:The Macmillan Press L TD.197 
' Sanders. DaYid. 1981. Patterns of Political Instability. London:The Macmillan Press LTD, 197 
'S:1ndcrs. Dm·id. 1981. Patterns of Political Instabili(v. London:The Macmillan Press LTD, 198 
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Figure 1. Dimensions and indicators of political instability (Sanders. 1981) 
instability (peaceful challenge and governmental change) to develop an internal 
dynamic of their own and to escalate into more disruptive forms of political behaviour 
(violent challenge and regime change instability). 
Secondly, it is important to note that these states still depend on the former hegemony 
of Russia. Russia's superior power will directly influence future Central Asian 
8 
stability. But we argue that the consequences of this will depend on the nature of 
regimes in the region and domestic stability in Central Asia. 
In this study Russian preponderance is taken as a given. Indeed, because of the vast 
difference in relative power between the Russian Federation and the Central Asian 
states, their relation should present an easy case for neorealism10• But power 
imbalances are not the main reason for conflict to generate11 : as Menon and Spruyt 
have written (1999): 
"An asymmetric balance of power is a systemic precondition for conflict but domestic 
variables are the key in explaining whether and how conflict will occur. I argue that 
the consequences of preponderance depend on the nature of the regime in the 
stronger power and the level of domestic stability in the weaker state". 
The particularities of state formation in Central Asia influence stability in the region. 
First, sovereign territoriality was imposed by an external power. In the beginning of 
the twentieth century the imperial centre formed the present borders of the states, 
according to the classical pattern of the policy of "divide and rule": Moscow 
supported elites that were favourably disposed to the Communist Party, assigned 
largely arbitrary borders to the republics and autonomous territories, and allotted such 
territories to a specific nationality. This was a deliberate strategy to weaken peripheral 
resistance by institutionalising ethnic differences (Menon and Spruyt, 1999). 
11
' Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spru}t. 1999. 'The Limits of Neorealism: Understanding Security in 
Central Asia". Review of International Studies 25: 87 
9 
Second, the Central Asian states are late developers. Late developing states have 
traditionally opted for interventionist economic policies and authoritarian government 
to catch up to and compete with earlier developers12. Third, because sovereign, 
territorial rule was imposed, rival identities, such as clan membership, Islam, ethnic, 
and regional affinities have not been displaced by centralising, high capacity states. 
When statehood is imposed on less developed societies, governments will constantly 
be challenged by alternative logics of political organisation 13 . Fourth, the absence of 
protracted interstate conflict means that the Central Asian state institutions have not 
been strengthened by war14. Fifth, these states lack any experience with democratic 
multi-party systems. Indeed, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR the communist 
elites have recast themselves in nationalist garb and have created authoritarian 
regimes 15 . 
These particularities suggest that local governments face three principal domestic 
challenges: creating a national identity, building effective political institutions, and 
coping with late economic development. 
11 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt. 1999. "The Limits ofNeorealism: Understanding Security in 
Central Asia". Review of International Studies 25: 87. 
12 The East Asian states are prime examples. 
13 Migdal, J. 1988.Strong Societies And Weak States. Princeton 
1 ~ Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making And State Making As Organised Crime". In Peter Evans, D. 
Rucschemeyer and T. Skocpol, ed.s. Bringing The State Back Jn., Cambridge 
;~ The wide spread opinion in the West that the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akaev 
wasn't a member of communist elite is wrong. He was the Communist Party secretary on Science 
which was high position. Aiyp Naryn. 1996. "Privatising Democracy". Stoliisa (2) 
10 
The problem of building effective political institutions is central to understand the 
conflict in Central Asia. It constructs and gears the mechanisms of conflict. Political 
institutions need to be institutionalised. By political institutionalisation I mean the 
combination of legitimacy and capacity possessed by states 16 . Legitimacy is a function 
of the degree of popular support. Capacity is the ability to extract resources, maintain 
stability and cope with opposition. I define social mobilisation as the activism of 
citizens who make demands on the state as a result of dissatisfaction and exposure to 
political, cultural, economic, and religious forces17. Mobilisation can be based on 
class, region, clan, religion or new ideologies that transcend such divisions. 
The weaker political institutionalisation is in relation to social mobilisation, the 
greater the chances are that the overburdened state will experience instability18. 
Political institutionalisation and social mobilisation will be particularly acute in Central 
Asia. Under conditions of weak political institutionalisation and strong social 
mobilisation 19, ruling elites will either be displaced or will use repression to retain 
power. Either response can lead to domestic disorder. 
16 Roberts, Geoffrey and Alistair Edwards. 1991. A New Dictionary of Political Analysis. London, 
New-York, Melbourne, Auckland: Edward Arnold, 82 
1 
- Roberts. Geoffrey and Alistair Edwards. 1991. A New Dictionary of Political Analysis. London, 
~cw-York. Melbourne. Auckland: Edward Arnold, 65 
:~ S. Huntington. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven 
1 9 A good example is the Tajik civil war. An imbalance between institutionalisation and social 
mobilisation in this country led to a breakdown of state authority. 
11 
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CHAPTER III. UNDERSTANDING THE PAST. 
3 .1. FER GHANA VALLEY AS A GEOGRAPHICAL UNIT. 
The F erghana Valley is surrounded by high mountains m the eastern part of 
Uzbekistan, southern part of Kyrgyzstan and the northern part of Tajikistan. The 
Kyrgyzstan lands occupy primarily the mountains and foothills of the Tien-Shan 
Mountains in the north and the Alay-Turkistan Mountains in the south, and from 
these mountains flow most of the waters which flow into the Syr-Darya, the main 
watercourse draining the Ferghana Basin. The Tajikistan lands are situated at the 
western opening of the valley where the Syr-Darya emerges from the valley into the 
desert-steppe, and includes the mountains to the north and south. The Ferghana 
Valley territories of Uzbekistan occupy the central part of the Valley, where the bulk 
of the agricultural land, most of the major cities, and more than half of the region's 
population are located (Ta6hIWa.JIHeBa, 19). In each of the countries, travel to the 
F erghana Valley lands requires that one either go over mountain passes or cross the 
territory of another country20 . 
In the respective republics there are the following administrative units: Andijan, 
Namangan and Ferghana districts (hokimiat) in Uzbekistan; Osh, Jalal-Abad and 
Batken21 districts (akimiat) in Kyrgyzstan; Leninabad district (oblast) in Tajikistan. 
:o Kyrgyz Jergesi. 1990. Frunze (Bishkek):322 
:i Balk.en is a district since 12 October 1999. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Newsline, 
12 October 1999 
13 
The Ferghana Valley is important in the sense of politics and economy for the 
respective republics. For instance, the Leninabad oblast is a strategic part of 
Tajikistan. There one of third of population of Tajikistan lives; it also consists of one 
fifth of its territory; it has three quarters of the agricultural land and produces one 
third of Tajikistan's GDP (OmrMoB H OnHMOBa: 1994). At the same time it is the 
most industrialised region of the republic and is the leader of foreign investment 
attraction (Om:1MOB H 0JIHMOBa: 1994). The taxes, which the inhabitants of the region 
pay to the central government, are the only permanent financial source for the 
republic (Om:1MOB H OnHMosa: 1994). Also the region has important political 
influence, for all the leaders of the republic were from this area during the Soviet 
. d22 peno . 
A full forty percent of the territory and fifty one percent of the population of the 
Kyrgyz Republic lies in the Ferghana Valley part of Kyrgyzstan (South) 
(Ta6h1IIIaJIHesa, AJIHIIIeea H Illyicypos, 2000: 6). This territory will play an important 
role in the future of this state. It has half the arable land, produces most of the cotton 
and has most of the coal reserves, more than half of all agricultural production and 
forty percent of industrial production23 . The Republic's main energy sources such as 
oil, natural gas, coal and hydro-electric power are also located here24. 
Tajikistan's Leninabad region was the home of all republican Communist party First Secretaries 
from 1943 until independence. Keith Martin. 1997. "Welcome to the Republic of Leninabad?". 
Central Asia4 (10) 
:.i Natil'nal Statistical Committee of The Kyrgyz Republic, http://stat-gvc.bishkck.su/ 
~ 1 f{b1p,~b13 31rquKJioneouJ1. 1989. "Olli 06:1acbr", EHurKeK 
14 
Although the Uzbek Ferghana Valley comprises a small part of the state's territory it 
is also important for Uzbekistan. Indeed it is the most populated and is the core of 
Uzbekistani population where the five of the ten largest cities of the state are 
situated25 . Consisting of a little bit more than 4.3 percent of its territory, Uzbek 
F ergana contains twenty seven percent of the population, one third of its arable land 
and produces almost a quarter of cotton and agricultural production26 . This territory 
is the source of the main water resources of the republic. Moreover the Minbulak oil 
reserve is the biggest discovered, allowing Uzbekistan to be independent in oil 
production27 . The Coca-Cola plant in Namangan and UzDaewoo in Asaka increase 
the industrial importance of the region. Also Tashkent (population 2.1 million, 1990; 
Glen E. Curtis, 1996), the biggest city in Central Asia, is located only 70 miles from 
the valley and depends on the valley's supply of food production, cotton and water. 
Ethnic connections in the region are very strong. It is difficult to find a family which 
has no relatives in other parts of the valley. In the Ferghana Valley many ethnic 
Uzbeks live in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and at the same time a lot of Tajiks live in 
Uzbekistan. Uzbeks constitute a very substantial minority in the Ferghana Valley 
provinces of Kyrgyzstan (twenty seven percent) and of Tajikistan (thirty one percent), 
and sometimes form the majority population in rural areas bordering on Uzbekistan 
(UNFVDP). Also the close proximity of Tashkent to the valley compared to Bishkek 
25 Glenn E. Curtis eds. Uzbekistan. Federal Research Division. Library of Congress. 
hitp://lrneb2.loc.g0\·/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+uz0000) 
26 United Nations "The Ferghana Development Program" (lJNFVDP). The Socio-Economic 
Situation. http://www.ferghana.elcat.kg/pe-soci.htm 
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and Dushanbe adds to the influence of Uzbekistan and its attempts to gain hegemony 
in the region. 
Furthermore, among the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyzes, there is also significant 
diversity. The Kyrgyz group, for example, subsumes marked differences not only 
between northern and southern, urban and rural groups, but also among genealogical 
groups that have a degree of group solidarity and play a significant role in the political 
life of republic28 . Amongst the Uzbeks, there are marked differences between the 
urban and rural populations, those historically or currently engaged in agricultural 
versus pastoralism, and amongst groups of differing heritage29 . The Tajik population 
includes people who have deep roots in the Valley and who often are much influenced 
by the long-standing contact with Uzbek, Kyrgyz and other neighbours, as well as 
others who have migrated more recently from remote mountain regions (OnttMOB u 
OmIMosa: 1994). 
Thanks to its geographical location and historical experience the valley's most 
important economical ties and infrastructure form one whole unit. For example, to go 
from one part of south Kyrgyzstan to another you have to cross the borders of 
Uzbekistan several times. The only highway connecting Tashkent and Uzbek 
:· RFE/RL Newsline, 5 August 1993 
:~ Huskey. Eugene. 1997. "Kyrgyzstan: the Fate of Political Liberalisation". In Karen Dawisha and 
Bruce Parrott, ed.s.,Conjlict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and Caucasus. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 254 
:; For information on Uzbek clans see Carlisle. Donald. "Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: 
From Stalin to Gorbachev". In William Fierman ed.,Soviet Central Asia: Failed Transformatton. 
San Francisco: Westview Press, 93-131. 
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Ferghana Valley goes through Tajikistan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union this 
entire infrastructure appeared in different states. Moreover the border division made 
by communists in the twenties century does not match the ethnic reality and now the 
border problem is urgent. For instance the Tajik part is closer to Uzbekistan than to 
other parts of Tajikistan as Buhara and Samarkand are considered by Tajiks 
historically to be theirs30 . There are also Uzbek and Tajik enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajik in Uzbekistan. 
In other words geographical unity and ethnic and economical connections made the 
F erghana Valley an integrated unit in the past; however, since the collapse of the 
USSR, independence and the demarcation of international borders have caused 
competition and tension. 
3.2. HISTORICAL LEGACY. 
The F erghana Valley never played a leading role in the region like Samarkand or 
Tashkent. The only exception, which is closely connected with present geopolitical 
situation in the Ferghana Valley, was the Kokand Khoganat31 . For the first and last 
30 Mirza Ziyoyev. a Tajik government minister has told journalists that Samarkand and Bukhara, 
now inside Uzbekistan's borders, are traditionally Tajik cities, implying that they should be included 
\\'ithin Tajikistan's borders sometimes in the future. Bruce Pannier. "Central Asia: Border Dispute 
Between uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Risks Triggering Conflict". RFE/RF, 8 March 1999 
31 Akbarzadeh. Shahram. 1997 ··A Note on Shifting Identities in the Ferghana Valley". Central 
. lsian Survey 16 (1):66 
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time m its history, under Kokand governors the territory of the Fergana Valley 
constituted one political unit. 
Seventy-five years of Soviet power in the region probably made the biggest influence 
after the coming of Islam 1200 years ago. During communist rule, particularly the 
national definition made by them in the 1920s, the region changed very much 
politically, economically, socially and even religiously. 
Indeed the Soviet legacy appears everywhere. Its political influence is shown in three 
ways. First, there have been different socio-economic problems since Soviet times. 
Secondly the role of the centre whether Tashkent or Bishkek is the same, with strictly 
limited self-governing for the periphery. And finally the Soviet tradition to pass a 
liberal, democratic law and then not follow it is still in practice. 
Now most experts think that the establishment of authoritarian types of government 
in Central Asian states is the logical continuation of pre-soviet history32. It may be the 
explanation why this type of government is so popular, at least in Uzbekistan. 
President Karimov likes to repeat that at times of big social and economical changes 
strict control by the centre is necessary for the maintenance of stability and peace33 . In 
fact despite the political and social tensions that started in the age of Brezhnev, most 
people think that Gorbachev's perestroika (reconstruction) was the main cause of 
1
= This means the leading Russian expert on Central Asia Oleg Panfilov. Panfilov, Oleg. 1998. "Five 
Royal Presidents Rule Their Kingdoms··. Transitions 5 (10) October 
116l1pHKOB, Cepreii. 1997. "Pecrry6rrHKa Y36eKHcraH: Mo1le11:i. AsTOpHTapHoii Mo.1lepmnaUHtt". 
/JocmoK l: 87-88 
18 
conflicts in Ferghana Valley in 1989 and 1990 and then the civil war in Tajikistan. 
Gorbachev weakened the control of the central government, allowed different 
political, ethnic and religious groups to declare their opinion (EttpjiKOB, 1997). 
Another aspect of the Soviet policy in Central Asia was the broad spectra of 
questions formed after the division of Turkestan34 into national and ethnic groups. 
This division of the region into national republics had no precedent in world history; 
everything was done to keep the Kremlin's control over the territories as the arbiter in 
questions was basically created by itself (MOJIJla.JIHeB: 30-31). In this sense the 
F erghana Valley is a good example of the Soviet legacy which will continue for 
decades after the collapse of the state which produced it. 
The economic legacy is unclear. On the one hand, as the poorest Soviet republics, 
they were subsidised35 . On the other hand, the success was measured in full literacy, 
free though poor health care, full employment (till the end of Brezhnev era), 
significant infrastructural development (rail- and highways, electrification, hydro-
electric stations and so on), access to service and employment of women. Compared 
to the almost total absence of all these things before Soviet power the results are not 
bad. Maybe that's why the collapse of the Soviet Union so heavily affected the 
Central Asian states36 . In this respective the Ferghana Valley is more vulnerable as 
·'
1 Turkistan is a geographical notion of the Central Asian territory before national delimitation in 
l 92-l 
" The Kyrgyz Republic's president Askar Akaev has acknowledged that before the Soviet Union is 
collapsed ten per cent of the republic·s budget was subsidised by the centre. Akaev's interview to 
.\'ezavisimaya Gaze/a, 17 October 1997 
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being the most heavily populated and as local elites are not in favour of present 
regimes in Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe. 
But the Kremlin's policy of economic specialisation of regions where every region 
was responsible for particular goods led to the quasicolonial exploitation of natural 
resources and the absence of developed industry in Central Asia. All of this deeply 
influenced the economy of the states. Probably one of the most serious factors in the 
F ergana Valley would be the ignorance by Soviet planners of administrative borders 
between the republics. Now most natural gas and electricity from Uzbekistan goes to 
its Ferghana part through Tajikistan. Trade routes between North and South 
Tajikistan go through Uzbekistan. Businessmen must take into account new realities: 
sometimes barter is the only way to make business operations. Moreover the 
customers' and transit fees create obstacles for business. 
A centralised planned economy led to two other results, which are now the reality of 
their economies. Firstly, there is still the parallel (black) economy that includes the 
system of bribes and the development of a kind of economic system that can be called 
organised crime. And now the black economy, the development of which was caused 
by the shortcomings of Soviet centralised planned economy, is significant in volume 
compared to the official one37. Secondly, in spite of all negative things, the economy 
·'
6 Standard of living fell sharply during. Everyone knows "lifo was better under communism". 
Nalle. David. 2000."Thc Ferghana Valley- 1999 A Personal Report". Central Asia Afcnitor 1 
37 Olimov, Muzaffar and Saodat Olimova. 1994. "Regionalism in Tajikistan: Its Impact on the 
Fcrghana Valley". Perspectives <'11 Central Asia 1 (3) 
20 
of the Central Asian states was "closer" to a market economy than in other parts of 
FSU (Former Soviet Union). 
Soviet power significantly influenced religion in almost all spheres of life but the 
USSR failed to control Islam in the region completely. Many Muslims attended 
"unofficial" mosques, others believed through traditions and customs. In other words 
there was always a "parallel" Islam which continues to exist to the present day. And it 
is particularly in the F erghana Valley that a lot of followers of conservative forms of 
Islam took root and particularly in this region the struggle against Islam was most 
severe even in the days of perestroika38. 
Definitely it is difficult to summarise all Soviet legacies and the above are only some 
main features. Though continuing to be in the grip of the Soviet legacy the leaders of 
the successor states sometimes seems don't understand it. All spheres of conflicts 
whether political or over economic resources, regional division, Islam, the decline of 
social security and ethnic relations, bear the deep and continuous influence of the 
Soviet era; any understanding of any conflict in the Ferghana Valley must begin with 
an understanding of this legacy. 
'~ 6a6aJKaHOB. Eaxnu1p. l 997. "<t>epraHCKaJI L{o.,Hna: HCTO'IHHK H:m )l(eprna Hc.,a~1cKoro 
<DyI-Um.1cHTa.,H3~ia?" l{eHmpW1bH05l A3wl 12 
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CHAPTER IV: SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. 
4.1. ECONOMY IN DECLINE. 
The Ferghana valley is one of the most populated regions in the world: about 450 
people per kilometre (Rowland, 1992: 232) including a significant proportion of 
young people39. From 1979 till 1993 the population of the three Uzbek parts of the 
Ferghana increased by 44 % (from 4.1 million till 5.9 million.). Taking into the 
consideration the contemporary growth of population one can forecast that within six 
it will increase to seven million40 . Moreover, such growth will affect and complicate 
the ethnic composition of the region because of different population growth rate 
among different ethnic groups. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the development of the economy did not keep 
up with population growth. On the contrary, the economic situation is in crisis; for 
example, from 1990 till 1996 the GNP of Kyrgyzstan fell by 53. 5 per cent41 , which 
severely affected the South where agricultural production is dominant. 
·
19 This is the second densely populated territory in the world after South China. PoccuiicKaJI. 
/(nema:..J.. 15Mayl993 
1
'
1 Economical Report on uzbekistan for 1991. 1992. Tashkent 
11 Abasov, Rafis. June-July 1999. "Problems of Economic Transition in the CIS: the Case of 
Kyrb'}ZStan", Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin, R (6). 
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Serious economic problems made President Karimov sack two of three heads of 
districts during five months42 . The economic figures especially the cotton crop, v.trich 
is the strategic product of Uzbekistan, sharply declined. In 1997 because of bad 
weather conditions the peasants produced only 60 percent of planned cotton43 . This 
caused a serious decline in the living standard of those for whom cotton growing is 
the only income. Many Soviet styled collective farms went bankrupt and people were 
forced to live on income from other sources44. 
The Leninabad viloyat of Tajikistan, contrary to the Uzbek and Kyrgyz part of the 
Ferghana valley, was always the most important economic part of the state. For 
instance, before the civil war this region produced 65 percent of tajikistan's GNP; this 
figure has probably increased, as the region is the only part of the state which was not 
damaged severely by war45 . In Tajikistan, which was the poorest republic in the 
former Soviet Union46, the civil war turned the economy into chaos and the north 
receives nothing from the central government. Although the living standard of the 
region is much better than in other parts of the republic it is worse than it used to be 
several years ago47. Currently, with the emergence of additional difficulties with its 
12 RFE/RL. 12 March 1996. News/ine. 
13 Rafik Saifulin. "The Ferghana Valley: A View from Uzbekistan". Perspectives on Central Asia 
14 Ilkhamov, Alisher. 2000. "Kolkhoz System vs Peasant Subsistence Economy in Uzbekistan". 
Central Asia Monitor,4 
1
' Olimov. Muzaffar and Saodat Olimova. l 994. "Regionalism in Tajikistan: Its Impact on the 
Fcrghana Valley". Perspectives on Central Asia 1 (3) 
.\(, 0,1HMOB H Osrn~IOBa. l 995."He3aBHCHMbIH Ta)f<JU<HCTaH - Tpy.rtHbl CTyTb nepe~ceH". BocmoK (1) 
1
- Chctcrian, Vickcn. 1999. "Pressure-Cooking in the Ferghana Valley". Transitions 3 (6), March 
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main trade partner Uzbekistan people of the region feel themselves more isolated 
politically and economically (OmtMOB H OJrnMosa: 1994). 
The economic situations in the three parts of the region are complicated also by social 
contradictions. Firstly, the people of the valley feel themselves insulted compared 
with other parts. Secondly, it increases tension between different ethnic groups during 
competition for scarce resources. 
All the above leads to a decline of living standard and ethnic tensions which may 
cause serious problems in the near future. For example, in Kyrgyzstan a low living 
standard applies to South Kyrgyzstan as a whole; the percentage of people living 
below the poverty line here is higher than in other parts of the republic and continues 
to grow48 . The average salary is about half of that in the capital49. For the last several 
years the distinction between rich and poor has increased; it is also ethnically 
coloured. Many Kyrgyz people think that they have fewer advantages over Russian in 
the North and Uzbeks in the South as historically they were not involved in trade and 
industry50 . In Soviet times the average salary in the Leninabad ob last was the highest 
48 Jumagulov, Sultan. 5 May 2000. "nomrrH'IeCKaJI 3mrra KbiprbIJCTcura". lnstitutefor War and 
Peace Report 
•
19 June 1996. Osh region. Economical Strategy: 15 
50Trade and industry are considered the most profitable. At the same time they associates with urban 
population which living standard is much higher than in the country. For example, in responding to 
the question of the sociological survey conducted in 1991 concerning the reason for the armed 
conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan's Osh district in June 1990, almost half of the 
experts (49%) mentioned unsatisfactory housing conditions. There were 58,000 people on the 
\\'ailing list for housing, of which Kyrgyz were a considerc:ble percentage. At the same time, among 
(retail) trade workers 71.+ % were Uzbek nationals, public dining facilities 7 4. 7%. Among the taxi 
drivers in Osh 79% were Uzbeks. Such inequalitf in employment in the most "prestigious·· spheres, 
which provided considerable opportunities for satisfying consumer demand in a general environment 
of consumer scarcity, has generated a feeling among pan of the Kyrgyz population, especially young 
people. of wounded pride and deprivation in their own land. (Elebaeva. 1992: 81) 
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in the republic but by September 1996 it was as less than half that of the capital (2366 
roubles compare to 5065)51 . This also concerns the Uzbek part of the valley where 
the living standard is lower than in the average in the republic. 
Almost in every republic of Central Asia unemployment is made worse by the 
presence of two "bad" sides of the Soviet and the third world systems. The collapse 
of the USSR led to the break of the economic ties between deliveries and consumers. 
Even today this is a problem for the region despite a less industrialised economy 
compared to, for example, Russia or Ukraine. This problem is complicated by rapid 
population growth and a higher percentage of young people compared to the 
European Commonwealth oflndependent States countries. 
These two problems have consequences: these young people grew up in the last years 
of the Soviet Union and had got used to receiving some privileges from the state. 
The problem of unemployment was one of the main reasons of recent ethnic conflicts 
in the Ferghana Valley. Specifically it caused the strengthening of the "Adolat" 
(Justice) organisation in the N amangan in 1992, and was one of the factors in the Osh 
turmoil in 1990 (see appendices, table 1). 
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4.2. AUTHORITARIANISM. 
It is difficult to say to what extent political factors are greater than economic or social 
but their influence on the stability in the region is considerable. Growing regionalism, 
the renaissance oflslam and ethnic division in the region are sources of future conflict 
in the Ferghana Valley. 
The situation has deteriorated because of other factors, especially the flood of 
refugees52 and its influence on the valley; suppression of human rights and freedom of 
speech; regional contradictions and the role of militaries. 
The geographical location and common Soviet history left Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan to some extent with similar political problems and circumstances. These 
three states face a deep socio-economic crisis, regional instability, potential ethnic and 
religious conflicts. In all three states where the population is divided into rich and 
poor (most of them fall into the latter one), significant wealth is directly connected 
with political power. Struggle for power is the attribute of development; however, it 
is sometimes difficult to analyse the scale and the quality of power struggle. 
Since independence Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan chose the different ways 
of development. The policy of reform is closely connected with the names of 
Presidents; in other words it is personalised. All of three states are authoritarian 
·'
1 1996 . . -1sia Plus: 6 
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especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where absolute autocratic regimes have been 
formed. 
The concentration of power in one hand has had a direct influence on stability in the 
region. On the one hand it stabilises the situation for short period of time. But it is 
problematic to keep stability for long period of time. The example of Uzbekistan's 
President proves how personal rule can obscure the establishment of 
institutionalisation and the emergence of the civil society. 
Does the sudden death or discharge of a President from the office mean inevitable 
crisis? Experience of countries of the third world does not give a clear answer, but 
this obviously means that building efficient democratic institutions and an equitable 
legal system are the best guarantors of permanent stability. 
Kyrgyzstan is Central Asia's "leading model" of democracy for Western countries 
with its political pluralism, freedom of speech and guaranteed human rights. But in 
recent years Akaev's regime has shown a trend towards authoritarianism. Now one 
could hardly characterise his regime as democratic. The President has prolonged his 
term in the office by a pseudo-democratic election in 1995 and definitely intends to 
run for a third term53 . After the last presidential elections Kyrgyzstan held two 
.<:In 199-l there were 2LOOO refuges on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Most of them were Tajik refuges 
(few were from Afghanistan) and as usual they settled in the South. UNHCR report, 1998. 
http://\n\w.unhcr.ch/statist/98oview/tab l _ 4.htm 
'
3 In the Kyrgyz Republic constitution the same person can not be a President more than two terms 
continually. But in the 13 July 1998 the Constitution Court of the Kyrgyz Republic passed ,·erdict 
tiiat Akacv could run for the Presidency one more time for he was elected by present constitution 
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referendums after which amendments to the constitution were made, greatly 
strengthening presidential power. Things are no better concerning human rights. 
Several publishers and several opposition figures have been arrested and jailed and 
corruption has reached the uppermost echelons of authorities54. The recent February 
2000 parliamentary elections, according to the Organisation on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe "were not in full compliance with OSCE commitments"55 . 
But, in spite of all shortcomings, the political regime in Kyrgyzstan remains the most 
open in Central Asia, and with greater efforts, tries to defend pluralism and the rule of 
law against a background of sharp social-economic crisis - instability in Tajikistan, 
and traditional opposition between the largest ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan society, 
Kyrgyz (former nomads) and Uzbeks (settled agrarian) and Russians, who suddenly 
find themselves in a new, foreign country after the disintegration of "their" empire. 
Civil war in Tajikistan not only has destroyed the country economically but also 
politically. Disintegration of the country has been so strong that some experts say that 
there is no longer a Tajik state56 . For the government, which completely depends on 
Russian army and field warlords, who directly participated in combat actions, the 
present peace treaty is only the very first step towards the construction of a new Tajik 
only one time (in 1991 he was elected according to old Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic's 
Constitution and present Constitution was adopted in 1993). 
51 Tmrnp6aes, Bjfljec:ias. 11 HoJ16pJ1 1999. "Cnpyr no l1.\1eHH Koppym.urn". Be•iepHHii I:illIIIKeK 
'' OSCE/ODIHR Releases Primarily Statement on Kyrgyzstan Parliamentary Elections. 
http: //w'' "\V. osce. org/indexe-se. htm 
>r, Namangani one of the leaders of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan who in the August-September 
captured several villages in the South of Kyrgyzstan and took hostages, bases on the territory of 
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state. But in any case, the peace treaty tells us about the change, if still only on the 
paper, from the authoritarian, uncontrolled rule of the south Kuliab clan formally 
headed by the president Rahmonov, towards greater pluralism57. 
4.3. REGIONALISM. 
Regional differences in the context of the Ferghana valley form two problems. First, 
there are no significant contradictions in the very valley within respective republics, 
for instance, between Osh and Jalal-Abad districts. Only in North Tajikistan does 
there exist a certain potential for conflict: this is the historical rivalry between the 
regional centre of Khujand with Ura-Teppe (in the southern part, the second largest 
city in the district) and Pendzhikent (in the western part, a geographically and 
economically this area is closer to Samarkand than to it is to Khujand). To a certain 
extent "President Rakhmonov has been trying to exploit these differences by 
encouraging demands from Ura-Teppe for greater authority and autonomy, and 
selectively promoting officials from that city over Khujandis"58 . But even in North 
Tajikistan this is nothing in contrast with the importance of the other aspect -
regionalism: conflict between corresponding parts of valley and their central 
government (ruling clan). 
neighbouring Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This events showed how freely can move different armed 
people on the territory of Tajikistan and to what extent central government control the situation. 
,- First post-war presidential elections in November 1999 where present President Imomali 
Rakhmono\· was the only candidate shows how fragile is situation in the republic. Bruce Pannier. 
"'Tajikistan: One-Man Presidential Race Shows Country's Fragility". RFE/RL, 13 October, 1999 
'X Keith Martin. 1997. "Welcome to the Republic ofLeninabad?". Central Asia, .i (10) 
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Regional political elites from the valley do not enjoy central power. This is more 
painful for the Khujand elite considering that they ruled the republic for almost the 
whole Soviet period59 . This is the main reason of present conflict in the Tajik part of 
valley where regional divisions are stronger than ethnic or religious ones. Regionalism 
was a main factor of civil war in Tajikistan. However, at the same time, the 
regionalism factor is also important in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, since decisions on 
the permanent economic prosperity of the region are made in capitals and often these 
decisions don't satisfy the local elites' interests. 
The Leninabad region, with its long history of political and economic domination in 
Tajikistan, has outlived a sharp economic decline. The exclusion of North Tajikistan 
from the 1997 peace negotiations on the conditions attached to the formation of a 
coalition government and from the National Revival Council shows that it will have 
no say in decision-making on the country's future. An assassination attempt on 
President Imamoli Rahmonov in Khujand and the arrest of the younger brother of 
Abdulatipa Abdulojanova as well as accusations against Abdulojanova himself 
threatens the further disintegration of the country (Keith, 1997). 
In Kyrgyzstan a problem also exists of strong, rival, internal and regional interests. Its 
scale is not as great as Tajikistan. Here there is a competition between the North 
around the capital and the lssyk-Kul lake, which is more industrialised and has a big 
Russian minority - and the South which is more agricultural and has a big Uzbek 
"
9 Since 1943 till independence. Keith Martin. 1997. "Welcome to the Republic ofLeninabad?". 
Central Asia, 4 (IO) 
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minority. In spite of the South having more then half of Kyrgyzstan's population it 
has little influence on the centre. Furthermore, despite the central government's 
attempts to help the South, many Southerners (both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz) think that 
Akaev's government favours for the North. For instance, all recent governors of Osh 
are from the North60. There also exists an economic side of the problem - most 
Southerners think that foreign investments basically go to the North, particularly to 
Bishkek61 . This is a general feeling in the South among Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. It is not 
yet clear how the ethnically divided but regionally united South can influence stability 
in the region. 
In Uzbekistan the importance of the regionalism problem is less clear because of lack 
of information and authoritarian regime established by Karimov. On the one hand one 
of the deciding elements in the maintenance of stability is his ability to balance 
regional interests. On the other hand, in the words of a Uzbek politician62, it was 
always important which regional alliances control a central power. Now it is clear that 
the F erghana valley is not one of the bases of Karimov' s power, which is centred on 
the Tashkent and Buhara/Samarkand regional elites63 . In any case, amongst the 
r,o President Akaev explains it as fight against tribalism. Sultan Jumagulov. 5 May 2000. 
"CTomrrWiecKaJI 3mrra KLq>rb13CTaHa". Institute/or War and Peace Report. 
61 According to the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic only eight per cent of 
direct foreign investments goes to Jalal-Abad district and twelve per cent to Osh district. But , for 
example, to Bishkek - 33.5 per cent and to Issyk-Kul - 41 per cent. National Statistics Committee of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 1999 
62 
"During a June 199 l visit to Tashkent, an Uzbek official close to Karimov told the author that the 
capllal was buzzing with rumors of feuding between President Karimov and Vice-President 
Mirsaidov, who was said to represent the interests of the Tashkent "merchant clan··. In general, there 
was much lalk of diYisions within the Uzbek elites along "clan'" lines, a phenomenon recognized by 
Karimov in the July 1991 interview cited above". Critchlow, James. 1991. "Nationalism in 
Uzbekistan". Boulder. San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 210 
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F erghana valley elite there exists a feeling of exclusion and this explains why Karimov 
so often dismisses the heads of regional administrations of the Ferghana valley of 
Uzbekistan. 
As in the South of Kyrgyzstan, there exists among Uzbeks of the Ferghana valley 
resentment that the region does not get foreign investments. Partly this is because the 
peasants are obliged to sell cotton to the state cotton at fixed prices64 . Finally, it is not 
clear how deeply these feelings interacts with religion in particular. Unlike president 
Rahmonov, Karimov does not tend to exclude the Ferghana elite completely, and 
remains popular amongst inhabitants of the Uzbek part of the valley, in spite of the 
repression of religious activists. With respect to the region he follows a policy of the 
"carrot and stick" - attracting little investments in the agriculture but simultaneously 
trusting the local authorities as well as criticising their political and economic policy65 . 
In reality it is one more aspect of his popularity-he directs all criticism to local and 
regional authorities in the valley as well as in Uzbekistan. 
"·' Carlisle, Donald. "Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev". !n 
William Fierman ed , Soviet Central Asia: Failed Transformation. San Francisco: Westview Press, 
118 
: McCray, Tom. 1997. ''Complicating Agiicultural Reforms in Uzbekistan: ObserYation on the 
Lower Zaravshan Basin''. Central Asian Mo11itor 2 
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4.4. RELIGION. 
What the role of Islam is presently and what it will be in the years to come is one of 
the most disputed questions among those who study the Ferghana Valley. Judging by 
the example of other Islamic countries many people predict a threat of 
"fundamentalism" to the region and all three leaders have expressed their anxiety66 . 
Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991 President Islam Karimov has warned 
of Islamic fundamentalism threatening the stability of the entire Central Asian region; 
justifying sustained harassment of Islamic groups at home, he has pointed to the 
bloody five-year war in neighbouring Tajikistan between communists and Islamic 
groups as proof of what would await Uzbekistan if religious fanatics were allowed to 
preach or ever settle in the countr:1. "I assure you that tomorrow when they declare 
Tajikistan an Islamic state they won't stop at that. An Islamic state with its ideology 
will come to us for sure through the Ferghana Valley", he declared on Tashkent 
television. However, "while I am President, we won't allow any Islamic order in 
Uzbekistan"67. 
At the same time religion plays an important stabilising role in a region burdened by 
social, economic and political changes. Presently in the Ferghana valley, Islam 
presents itself as more than a religion - it is a lifestyle and the core of the local 
community. All leaders of Central Asia try to encourage religion, because it promotes 
1
"'' As a rule they finger the example of Tajikistan. And in countries such as Uzbekistan that threat is 
used to justify repressive policies - the logic is that slow social reform will prevent the spread of 
radical Islam. Bruce Pannier. "A :-.Jeed for Common Ground in Tajikistan". See speci:il issue "The 
Islamic Threat in Central Asia: Myth or reality?" in Transition, 24 (1), 29 December 1995 
,,- Bruce Pannier. "President Blames Two ior Bombing". RFE/RL, 19 March 1999 
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stabilisation, and, simultaneously, raises a sharp objection to political Islam; but the 
border between these modes of behaviour is not always clearly defined. President 
Karimov follows a policy of "early warning", and has quickly dealt with any popular 
independent Moslem leader who threatens his personal authority. But this can cause 
an inverse reaction amongst populations and interested political groups. 
In Kyrgyzstan the problem of Islam is not as strong as in Uzbekistan. The division in 
South Kyrgyzstan is more ethnic than religious. In Tajikistan the role of Islam differs 
from other countries of the region, at least at the state level, since an Islamic party is 
part of the government coalition according to the peace treaty. But political Islam in 
Tajikistan has not so important a role; an Islamic party was even included in coalition 
government and can serve a signal for Moslem activists in Uzbek and Kyrgyz parts of 
valley. 
In Uzbekistan differences exist not only between Islam and the state, but also within 
Muslim society, usually based on differences of "official" and "parallel" Islam in the 
Uzbek part of valley. In fact, one can say these differences are greater between 
Muslim and state officials. One can easily see an open hate between the official 
"state" clerics and the representatives of the Wahhabism movement68 . 
'·~ Babajanov. Bahtiyar. l 999. 'The Ferghana Valley: Source or Victim oflslamic Fundamentalism?" 
( 'entra/ /lsia and Caucaus. 4 (5) 
34 
The Ferghana valley, particularly the Uzbek part, for a long time was known as a 
home of Islamic activists, often called "Wahhabist"69 . If there is any tension between 
Islam and the Uzbek state, probably it will be expressed here in the Ferghana valley. 
In 1991-1992 a conflict of such sort occurred. In November 1991, the "Wahhabis" 
and other Muslims activists staged a demonstration in the town and captured a 
Communist party building with the intention of establishing an Islamic centre in 
Namangan10 . The protest was quickly transformed into a movement for Muslim self-
government. The officials accused Islamic extremists over the bloody Tashkent 
bombing on 16 February 1999. The two men the Uzbek government has labelled as 
organising the attack - Takhir Yuldash, the leader of Hizb-ut-Tahrir; and Mohammed 
Solih, the leader of the banned Erk Democratic Party-- remain outside the country 
and beyond the grasp of Uzbek authorities71 . 
At the end of August 1999 a religious extremist group known as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan took 13 hostages including four Japanese geologists captive 
in the Batken district (then Osh district). The militants, led by Juma Namangani (an 
ethnic Uzbek field commander based in Tajikistan) demanded the release of 50,000 
prisoners from Uzbek jails, and their safe pass into Uzbekistan. Almost two month of 
69 Known as the puritans of the Islamic faith, the Wahhabis believed in the establishment of a 
Muslim community similar to that which existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad when Islam 
dominated every facet of the believer's life (Haghayeghi, 1996). The Wahhabi movement was 
introduced to Central Asia from India in the early nineteenth century (Haghayeghi, 1996). They are 
believed to be a fundamentalist movement appeared at the end of the 1970s in Tajikistan 
(Malashenko, 1993) or in the Ferghana valley (Haghayeghi, 1996) who began to call themselves 
Wahhabis. But Abduvakhitov (1993) says that term's apparent origin traces to reports commissioned 
by Moscow officials and exploited by the authorities to discredit them. 
-o Mehrdad Haghayechi. 1994. "Islam And Democratic Politics In Central Asia". Wold Affairs, 156 
(1).#4:190 
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crisis ended with the release of the hostages and the payment of a ransom72 . "The 
significance of this recent incident is that the level of instability is far higher than had 
previously been assumed"73 . 
In all three countries of Central Asian region, policy in respect of religion is directed 
towards a balance between the support for Islam as a faith and checking it so that it 
does not get out of control, limiting any possibilities of the appearance of 
antigovernment politicians of Islam. In Uzbekistan, learning from the experience of 
other Muslim countries such as Turkey and Indonesia, President Islam Karimov 
actively supports religious activity by constructing mosques, supporting pilgrim to 
Mecca and giving significant financial and political support to official clerics. For 
instance, many foreign funds, particularly Turkish and Saudi, finance official clerics 
and thus facilitate their control by the state74. Finally, President Islam Karimov has 
"islamised" himself, going from the leader of the Communist party and an atheist to 
taking an oath on the Koran and making the hajj to Mecca 75 . 
'
1 B. Pannier and Z. Eshanova. "Uzbekistan: Trials Against Tashkent Bombing Suspects Begin". 
RFEIRL, 13 May 1999 
72High-ranking sources in the Kyrgyz Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs confirm that the Japanese government, at the recommendation of Kyrgyz officials, paid US 
$2 million dollar ransom for the release of the Japanese hostages in the form of Official 
Development Assistance. Marchenko, Tamara. 19 January 2000 "Rethinking Namangani: The 
Ramifications of Paying Terrorists". Central Asian and Caucasus Analysis 
~ 3 Akiner, Shirin's, Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 
comments on the hostage crises. Bruce Pannier. "Uzbek Militants' Presence Causes Concern. 
RFE/RL, 31 August 1999 
-
1 Mchrdad Haghayechi. 1994. "Islam And Democratic Politics In Central Asia". Wold Affairs, 156 
(l),#4:190 
-s Birgit Brauer. 5 November 1999. "The Lure Of Fundamentalism"'. Central Asia ~md Caucasus 
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The Uzbek government uses, on the one hand, a policy of " carrot and stick", 
supporting the renaissance of Islam but banning political parties based on religion 
particularly in the Ferghana valley, though such prohibition will be lifted in Tajikistan 
according to the peace accord76 . As part of a declared policy on preventing 
politicisation and organisation of Islam, the Uzbek government uses all possible 
methods: hundreds of Islamic activists are in prison and at least three have 
disappeared without trace77 . 
The repressive policy of Uzbek authorities against Islamic activists has compelled 
many to immigrate to Kyrgyzstan. Around Jalal-Abad they have organised and built 
several mosques and religious schools, with Uzbek followers basically (Haghayeghi, 
1996: 95). There is some evid~nce that their activity is directed to the Uzbek part of 
the Fergana valley. This has resulted in pressure from the government of Uzbekistan 
on the regional authorities of Osh and Jalal-Abad. There is already some evidence that 
the Uzbek intelligence service has a network of agents on the territory of South 
Kyrgyzstan to watch Islamic activists78 . 
Generally speaking, the presence of Uzbek Islamic activists can cause tensions 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Uzbeks are considered "better" Muslims then Kyrgyz 
whose nomadic past has resulted in a different Muslim attitude; they already visit 
76 Cheterian, Vicken. 1999. "Pressure-Cooking in the Ferghana Valley". Transitions, 3 (6) 
More than 500 people were arrested in Tashkent after 16 February 1999 bomb explosions. Press-
rcleasc of human rights organisation in Osh. Kyrg)zstan. 
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mosques differently and at different time (because Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have 
different time and Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan follow the Uzbekistani time) 
(Ta6hilllaJrn:eea: 10). 
Another problem is a direct result of the civil war in Tajikistan. According to some 
sources 500 inhabitants of Namangan joined the Tajik opposition in North 
Afghanistan and fought to make an Islamic state in Tajikistan79. It is clear that their 
intention is not limited only to Tajikistan. The establishment of a coalition government 
in Tajikistan will become a catalyst for the greater activity of Islamic groups in the 
region, including the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley. This is not the result of the 
integration of the Islamic opposition into the coalition government but is mainly the 
result of the end of the civil war which led to the appearance of the phenomenon of 
"kalashnikov culture". "With the end of war, those fighters who do not belong to any 
particular political group and who earned their living fighting during the war lost their 
purpose"80 . 
With the exclusion of Afghanistan, foreign influence upon political Islam until now 
has been limited. Iran is one of the least important players. There is some evidence 
that the "Wahhabists" get enormous amounts of financial support from Saudi Arabia 
78 This fact acknowledged the Kyr~z newspaper, loyal to state authorities. There are some hints 
that Bishkek sanctions operations of Uzbek intelligent service on its territory. AceJIL Orop6aesa. 
2000. "BecHa: Tpesorn 06ocHOBaHbI". Be11ep1mii EuiuKeK, 25 <t>espan:b 
-
9 Anvar Usmanov. Uzbek political emigrant living in Munich, Germany gives this information in 
the program "Caucasus and Central Asia. Authoritarian Regimes Lie that They are Necessary for 
Stability". RFE/RL, 5 November I 999 
xn Birgit Brauer. 5 NO\ ember 1999. "The Lure Of Fundamentalism". Central Asia and Caucasus 
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and Pakistan81 . Theological differences between shiism in Iran and sunnism in Central 
Asia are considered to be the main reason why Iran does not try to spread Islamic 
ideology and influence in the region. Additionally, this state considers its commercial 
and trade interests with these countries as being more important. 
The influence of the situation in Afghanistan on the region is very strong and 
complex. There is already anxiety about Afghanistani support for the Tajik Islamist 
opposition, many of whom were trained in North Afghanistan82. Presently, however, 
Tajik and Uzbek official persons understand that support and participation of the 
Islamists fails any comparison with the threat of the "Taliban", and this explains a 
desire of the involved parts in the Tajik civil war to force President Rahmonov and 
the opposition sign a peace agreement. 
Generally speaking, concerning religion and its influence on stability in the F erghana 
Valley and in Central Asia as a whole, one can conclude that the Islamic threat to 
stability is more of an imagined threat. Indeed, "Tashkent has used the imagined 
Islamic threat as an excuse for its authoritarian politics internally and territorial 
consolidation externally"83 . 
81 Zbigniew Brzezinski hints that Saudi Arabia surports Wahhabism in Central Asia. An Interview 
With Zbigniew Brzezinski. 14 February 1999. 'Thoughts on the Political and Geo-strategic 
Realities of the Caucasus and Central Asia". Central Asia and Caucasus Analyses 
Rashid. Ahmed. 1999 ... The Taliban: Exporting Extremism." Foreign . l_ffairs, 
1\lm·embcr/D;::cember 
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Central Asian leaders are growing increasingly authoritarian. Their rigged elections 
and restrictions on political parties have undermined democratic alternatives, leaving 
underground Islamist movements as the only political opposition. 
x.i Shahram Akbarzadeh. 1 March 2000. "Is Islam Threat To Stability In Central Asia?". Central 
/lsia and Caucasus Analyses. 
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CHAPTER V. GREAT DRUG ROAD? 
5.1. CORRUPTION AND ORGANISED CRIME. 
One of the main factors which can destabilise the situation in Central Asia is not the 
economy itself but the mechanism of the black economy formed during decades and 
resulting in wide spread corruption and organised crime. 
For a long time organised crime has caused economic stagnation and it may be the 
only reason for the failure of any government's development policy; indeed without 
solving this problem any reforms will fail to influence the valley positively. 
As was mentioned above one of the legacies of Soviet power was the integration of 
economies of the regional states. In the centralised economy when the basic goods, 
services and control were in short supply, a parallel, highly organised criminal 
economical system developed alongside the official one. In the last years of Soviet 
power one could hardly distinguish between the "parallel" and official economies -
the borders between them weren't clear84 . 
With the end of the Soviet era the scale of organised crime and corruption sharply 
increased. A recent survey showed that corruption is widespread among who 
distribute the deficit goods and services (trade, business and etc.) and who control 
81 
'·Employment and National State in Soviet Central Asia: Difficult Compromise". Preston 
University Press, 1984 , Chapter 6 
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and govern these sectors of the economy (high-ranking officials, police and court 
organs, prosecutor and etc. )85 . It also includes the bribes to work in these sectors. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of state monopoly in these spheres 
of public life most observers remark that corruption and organised crime has reached 
an incredible level86(see appendices, figure 2). 
Some people point to other states' examples and try to show that corruption and a 
black economy have a positive side and can play a stabilising role. The supporters of 
this idea believe that it helps to redistribute income in favour of the poor stratum of 
the population but unfortunately one can't see these investments, and organised 
crime's potential to destabilise the situation in the region is high. The poor don't get 
rich but poorer! Corruption and organised crime have sharply increased the 
distinction between rich and poor and also increased the anger of the population 
against the officials and bureaucrats and have shaken their belief in political leaders, 
police, ministers and others, who are regarded as working only for their own 
interests. 
But the most important thing is that corruption and organised cnme completely 
weaken/break the official economy and is the main and may be the only one barrier to 
democracy and market economy directed to solve the economic problems which have 
already caused conflicts in the region and are still a threat to stability. The more 
corruption and organised crime occur after independence the more the population is 
x5 Ec1crypraHoB H MOM)'HOB. 2000. "E)'M<VKHaH )];eM0KpanU1". Be'lepHuu Euw.KeK, 25 <l>esprum 
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sceptical of reforms and legal private business including their negative attitude to 
small business 
Indeed most of the respondents in some survey in Central Asian states directly 
associate economic reforms with the increase of corruption and disorder87. Because 
of their private interests officials are not interested in changing the present situation 
into something more open and just. Generally democracy and a market economy are 
based on the rule of law and cannot be established in an economic framework most of 
which operates outside this law. 
Corruption also destroys and has a destabilising political effect on society in the 
whole. In the Soviet Union the charge of corruption was often used purely to dismiss 
officials for political reasons. Throughout Central Asia this method is actively used 
against journalists who investigate corruption88 . The court system is widely regarded 
as corrupt89. Finally at a time when the standard of living is declining, the high 
expenditure on bribes has a destabilising effect. 
86 Zanny Minton Beddoes. 7 February 1998. "A Caspian Gamble. Central Asia Survey". The 
Economist, 15 
8 i "Central Asia Take Stock: Reform, Corruption And Identity". USA Institute of Peace, 1995 
88 For attacks on journalists in Central Asia see article by Abdumannob Polat. 1995. "Central Asia 
Political Refugees". Central Asia Monitor, 2-3 
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5.2. DRUG TRAFFICKING. 
This informal economy system and corruption and organised crime established the 
base for one of the biggest businesses in Central Asia and definitely in the Ferghana 
valley - the illegal production and transportation of drugs and probably other goods. 
Drug smuggling has been a feature of the region for a long time but started to 
increase sharply in the mid of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, first because of 
the war in Afghanistan and then because of the collapse of the USSR. Now that the 
valley is isolated in terms of trade and communications from the rest of the region 
because of its geography and state policy the Ferghana valley is the ideal place to 
process and transport opium and other drugs grown mainly in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to the West. Some trafficking routes go from Central Asia to Belarus, 
Ukraine or Romania before going to the West. Other routes go through the war torn 
Caucasus region, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey9°. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Asian states' border with 
Afghanistan, Iran and Russia became transparent and weakly controlled. Most drugs 
are transported along the 750 kilometres long Osh-Horog road from the Afghan-Tajik 
border to the Kyrgyz city of Osh91 . According to the United Nations Drug Control 
Program, along this road goes "more than 2,000 trucks per month ... (the road) is 
widely believed to be the most commonly used way to smuggle a large portion of the 
89 EeJ<TYPraHOB H MoMyHOB. 2000. "EyMIDKHrur .ll:eMOKpaTIDI". Be'lepHuil EuutKeK, 25 <l>eBpaJIH 
90 18 November 1999. "The Drug Problem in Central Asia" Central Asia and Caucasus Forum 
,)'ummary 
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opmm produced in Afghanistan, estimated at over 2,400 metric tons annually"92. 
Some people argue that corruption and crime and especially the arms trade to some 
degree stabilise the situation because they provide incomes and work and even initial 
capital for business. But as in other states, the drug trade destabilises the situation: 
the concentration of revenue in a few hand destroys the official economy, increases 
the possibility of competition between different criminal groups and disrupts the rule 
of law especially in the police force. And definitely drugs is the main barrier to radical 
reforms. According to the words of the Kyrgyz Ambassador to the US: "When 
Islamic extremists took Japanese hostages in Batken, the drug issue came to the fore. 
The leader of the kidnappers, Juma Namangani controls 70% of the drug trafficking 
in the region"93 . 
In fact drug growing, production and transit in the Ferghana valley influences the 
whole structure as measured in the crime rate, the effect on families and the economy. 
The Kyrgyz ambassador concludes that "drugs have dramatically changed the 
psychology of the Kyrgyzstan people"94. On the other hand, the criminal drug groups 
91 Kyrgyzstan Ambassador to USA Abdrisaev. Central Asia and Caucasus Forum Summary: Drugs: 
A Threat To Central Asian Security. 15.03.2000. 
92 
"UN Drug Program to Launch Regional Law Enforcement Project Linking Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
And Uzbekistan". Press Release, http://www.odccp.org/press release 1997-05-02 I.html 
93 Kyrgyzstan Ambassador to USA Abdrisaev. 15 March 2000. "Drugs: a Threat to Central Asian 
Security". Central Asia and Caucasus Forum Summary 
91 Kyrgyzstan Ambassador to USA Abdrisaev. 15 March 2000. "Drugs: a Threat to Central Asian 
Security''. Central Asia and Caucasus Forum Summary 
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are interested in destabilising the situation in the region for they want the state 
structures to be weak and unstable95 . 
The influence of criminal groups on ethnic relations is not definite. On the one hand, it 
probably has a negative effect on attitudes toward Russians as they are considered to 
be the main drug traders. Observers say that the Russian rnilitaries, especially the 201 
motorised division in Tajikistan and Russian border troops are greatly involved in 
narco-business96 . Russian border troop are viewed not as soldiers but drug traders: 
some evidence of this lies in the destination between the figures of confiscated and 
delivered quantity of drugs for inspection. For example "authorities said about 400 
kg. of drug were confiscated in 1996 but only seven kg. from one source and SO kg. 
from another were actually delivered for inspection"97. 
On the other hand crime in the former Soviet Union was international in nature and 
still is. One former officer in Osh said: "Where drugs are concerned different criminal 
groups cooperate. The Tajiks get opium from Afghanistan, and if they transit it 
through Uzbekistan then they hire the Uzbek courier or if to Almaty then they hire the 
Kyrgyz in Bishkek. 98" 
95 Olimov. Muzaffar and Saodat Olimova. 1994. "Regionalism in Tajikistan: Its Impact on the 
Ferghana Valley". Perspectives on Central Asia l (3) 
9
•' Lange Keely. "When Drug Lords are Warlords". Transition Vol. 2, No 19, 20 September 1996 
r Voice of Free Tajikistan, 15 April 1997 
08 Voice of Free Tajikistan, 15 April 1997 
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Smuggling in the Fergana valley is not limited to drugs only. Some observers note the 
increase of arms trade in the region and the quantity of weapons in the hand of the 
population. The president of the Nuclear Physics Institute in Tashkent, A Yuldashev, 
says that any material can be carried through the territory of Central Asia. " I 
guarantee that if someone steals nuclear material he can transport it anywhere. There 
are 150 border posts in Uzbekistan and none of them have equipment to find this 
material. 99"Proof of weapons smuggling was the scandal in Kyrgyzstan when the 
authorities captured 700 tonnes of weapons going to Afghanistan from Iran100. 
Generally, corruption, organised crime and drug transit influence the state of the 
police and the military, that is, on organs both of which are important to the stability 
and order of the region. 
99 Graham Turbivii. May 1997. Presentation In The US Institute For Peace. 
1 00 RFE/RL, 13 October 1998, Ncwsline 
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CHAPTER VI. White Gold: The Cotton Dictatorship. 
When at the end of the 19th century Central Asia fell under the control of the Russian 
Empire the Russians started to introduce cotton as a monoculture in the Ferghana 
valley and Central Asia in the whole. The amount of Central Asian lands under 
cotton cultivation rose more than 70 times between 1870 and 1916101 . 
Then in the 1930s the Soviet government used repressive methods under the 
command economy to establish cotton development as a monoculture crop. Moscow 
viewed cotton as a strategic resource and financed production accordingly. Due to 
huge investments, Soviet Uzbekistan in the 1960s and 1970s became one of the 
world's largest cotton producers and the site of the largest irrigated region in the 
former Soviet Union. By the 1980s "white gold" constituted more than two-thirds of 
Uzbekistan's gross output and employed about 40 per cent of the labour force. In 
1983, Uzbekistan alone produced almost as much cotton as the entire United 
States102. As late as the mid-1960s, half of the sown area in Uzbekistan was still 
covered by grain, fodder and vegetables103 but by 1990 the cotton fields covered more 
than 85-90% of some areas in the Ferghana Valley104. 
101 January 1996. Perspectives on Central Asia, 1 (1). 
102 Rumer, Boris. 1989. "Soviet Central Asia. A Tragic Experiment". Boston: 62 
103 Glantz, Michael; Rubinstein, Alvin Z. and .Zonn, Igor. 1993. "Tragedy in the Aral Sea Basin: 
Looking Back to Plan Ahead?". Global Environmental Change, 2 (3): 176 
11
,,i Craumer, Peter R. 1992. "Agricultural Change, Labor Supply And Rural Out-1\t:igration In Soviet 
Central Asia." In Robert A. Lewis ed., Geographical Perspectives On Soviet Central Asia, London: 
Routledge, 144 
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However, the forced growth of cotton has given rise to unresolvable problems in the 
water balance of the region, creating "one of the very greatest ecological problems of 
our century" 105 , an "impending disaster" 106, and "a dangerous experiment with 
nature" 107 . 
The water resources of Central Asia's two major rivers-the Syr-Darya and Amur-
Darya have been practically drained dry by cotton irrigation systems. Therefore, the 
water from these rivers does not reach the Aral Sea, which has caused a precipitous 
drop in its level. If the situation is not changed, the Aral Sea is likely to disappear by 
the middle of the next century108. 
6.1. Water. 
Presently we already have groups of ten of 
conflicts because of land and water (from 
the speech of President of Uzbekistan of Islam 
Karimov on meeting of Central Committee of 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 23 March 1990) 
In the next century, cause of a war will be fresh water (from the report of Worldwide Banlc, 
quoted in «The Economist» , 
Vol. 336, No. 7927, August 12, 1995, p. 36). 
to' IO 
· cynos. IO CeHrJ16pJ1 1987. llpa60a BocmoKa: 3 
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6 Ky;raw6epreHos., 6 Mall 1987 Jlumepamyp11Wl I'mema: 6 
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"x Kulchik, Yuri. "Central Asia After the Empire: Ethnic Groups, Communities and Problems". Ed. 
Roa Id Sagdev• and Eisenhower, Susan. Central Asia. Resnlution, and Change: 95 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century only about five per cent of the total river 
flow was used for irrigation 109 but the expansion of the irrigation area led to a steady 
reduction in the flow of water into the Aral Sea until it stopped altogether. Indeed, 
water use in Central Asia is enormous. In 1988, the water withdrawal in the Aral Sea 
basin for all purposes was 125% of the average annual water resources110. 
Water demands are dominated by the needs of t~e agricultural sector, accounting for 
87% of the total use"'. Irrigation is the main cause for the water crisis in Central 
Asia. The rapid extension of the irrigation area since the 1950s caused immense water 
use wastage and heavy losses in the distribution and transmission system of irrigation 
water (an estimated 30-40 %)112. Moreover, in Central Asia as a whole, the water 
usage rates are 25-7 5% higher than the established norm 113 . 
The influence of distribution and qualities of water on political and econorruc 
development of new countries of Central Asia has increased. In spite of several 
agreements signed by the Central Asian republics on water management in the region 
(the last one was signed in February 1997) each republic looks to its own needs first. 
109 Figures for Amu Dar'ya are: 1917 7% of the river flow, 1955 15% and 1983 more than 50% (see 
Stefan Klotzli. "The Water and Soil Crisis - A Source For Future Conflicts?", ENCOP Occasional 
Paper,# 11 
11° Figures taken and calculated from Philip Micklin. pp. 90-93 and from other sources. Micklin, 
Philip. "Water Management Problems in Soviet Central Asia: Problems and Prospects". 
111 Stefan Klotzli. "The Water And Soil Crisis - A Source For Future Conflicts?", ENCOP 
Occasional Paper, # 11 
11 : Raskin, Hansen, Zhu and lwra. 1992. "Simulation of Water Supply and Demand in the Aral Sea 
Region'·. Water International, 17:60. 
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The problem is complicated by the fact that almost all water flows from one country 
into another. This demands an approach to water management which is sustainable in 
the long run. But the lack of land resources and arid climate, limited annual and 
seasonal access to water, obscure borders can enlarge the probability of potential 
conflict in the region because of water. 
Problems which did not exist ten years ago appeared to be actual since three countries 
became independent: as long as they were within the structure of one country there 
were no problems of management and water payments; all fell into one economic 
system. Now Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which have the majority of water-reservoirs, 
have to support a system, the waters of which are basically used by Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan114. According to Bransten: 
In Soviet times, it was easy, Kyrgyzstan's mountains held the water and 
Uzbekistan's fields the cotton. So year after year, the State Planning Commission 
(Gosplan) in Moscow ordered Kyrgyzstan to empty most of its reservoirs to 
water Uzbekistan's plantations of "white gold." The Uzbek harvest filled the 
Kremlin's coffers and Moscow made sure that Kyrgyzstan received just enough 
in compensation subsidies to keep the operation going. 
After the Soviet Union fell apart at the end of 1991, and both states gained their 
independence, the deal lost much of its appeal to the Kyrgyz. They continued to 
113 Boris Rumer: 1989. Soviet Central Asia. A Tragic Experiment, Boston:76 
114 Of the 50,000 million cubic meters of water that Kyrgyzstan's lakes and reservoirs collect each 
year, only 12,000 million cubic meters remain in the country. 
Jeremy Branstcn. Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: The Politics of Water. RFE/RL, 14. October 1997 
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provide their water, free of charge, to Uzbekistan, but now received no subsidies 
from Moscow. By contrast, Uzbekistan began to grow richer, since it no longer 
had to deliver any of its cotton profits to the Kremlin 115 . 
Relations between the countries of Central Asia in many ways depend on the 
differences in the condition of development since the beginning of their independence. 
This includes energy resources and access to fresh water. Uzbekistan has significant 
resources of oil and natural gas; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack both. However, these 
two countries have great qualities of fresh water, which Uzbekistan does not have. 
This is why the conflict over the sharing of fresh water between the three republics is 
. b bl 116 qmte pro a e . 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can block water access to Uzbekistan completely. But 
Uzbekistan has energy resources and this will certainly be a trump card to gain access 
to the water resources of upstream countries. Now relations between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan are already completely decided in the context of water relations. 
Uzbekistan often shuts off natural gas supply to Kyrgyzstan because of debts, which 
makes Kyrgyzstan take reprisals, for instance by blocking the water supply. The 
December 1999 crisis when Uzbekistan cut natural gas supply spurred Kyrgyzstan 
into increasing energy production in the Toktogul Hydro-electric Station which leads 
to a water deficit in spring-summer for Uzbekistan117. 
1 ::; Jeremy Bransten. Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: The Politics of Water. RFEIRL, 14. October 1997 
116 In the summer of 1989, armed conflict occurred between the Kyrgyz of Isfara and Tajiks in the 
neighbouring Batken (Kyrgyzstan) over the division of the enclave's water and land resources ... 
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In any case, relations between the countries of the region in the context of water 
problems will depend on internal policy and situations in each country separately; 
governments which successfully carry out economic reforms are more likely to solve 
the regional water problem. 
6.2. Land. 
The borders between the countries of Central Asia are among the most complex and 
tangled in the world. The administrative borders created by the communists in the 
1920s do not follow any ethnic and demographic lines. Moreover, there are several 
enclaves on the territory of different states118. There have been already ethnic conflicts 
in which land has been the cause. In 1989 the border between Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan was the cause of conflict; the Osh riots which caused the death of more 
than 200 people was also because ofland (Ta6bnuarrn:eBa, 2000: 20). 
11
' Autumn-Winter 1999-2000 gas crises between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan the first Vice Prime-
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Boris Silaev characterised as a "political pressure" of Uzbekistan. 
Then he added that Kyrgyzstan had to increase energy production which can lead to water deficit in 
spring-summer for Uzbekistan. A. Tuzov. "Gaza Ne Budet Do Novogo Goda!" (No Natural Gas till 
New Year!"), Vecherniy Bishkek, 22 November 1999. 
118 There are three enclaves in the south part of Kyrgyzstan: Uzbek Shakrimardan, Sokh and Tajik 
Vorukh. The nature of this enclaves are not clear still. Shakrimardan, Sokh and Vorukh were among 
the hotbeds of the anti-Communist Basmachi guerilla, which was particularly fierce there in the 20 -
301h years. After the Red Army pacified the region, these politically unreliable areas went under 
direct military administration from Tashkent, the Soviet stronghold in Central Asia. It is during this 
period that the present-day enclaves got oriented more towards Tashkent in terms of transport and 
telecommunication links and economic activity than to its immediate surrounding area. In 1936, 
Shakrimardan, Sokh and Vorukh (all agricultural enclaves in a quite arid area) were integrated in 
Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikikstan, for one considered that the Uzbeks and Tajiks 
(sedentary farmers) would need more agricultural area than the far less numerous Kyrgyz (mountain 
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The borders between the Central Asian republics have long been problematic. There 
is also a problem of disputed territories between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan in the Ferghana valley. Many irrigation channels were built in the Soviet 
times, most of which cross the territory of different countries. Tensions grow between 
local administrations on both sides of channels because of financial questions, in 
particular who pays maintenance costs (Mon.na..rr:ueB, 2000: 31). 
In the summer of 1989, according to official information from the Telegraph Agency 
of Soviet Union ( TASS), a long-standing dispute over land and water rights in a 
number of areas on the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan led to the conflict 
known as the Batken K yrgyz-Tajik conflict. Only after the involvement of the militia 
(police) and internal troops using weapons was the conflict brought under control: 
19 people were wounded, one of whom died in consequence119. 
One year later there was fighting in south Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz capital of Frunze 
(now Bishkek) and areas of Uzbekistan's Ferghana, with martial law being imposed in 
a member of locations for a considerable period of time. By August 17, 1990, when 
the violence had for the most part subsided, TASS had placed the death toll at 230, 
with 400 unaccounted for120 : 
nomads). Interesting fact is that Uzbek enclave Soch is inhabited mostly by Tajiks, 99%. UNDP in 
Kyrgyzstan. http://www.undp.kg/english/batken.html 
119 H.B. Paksoy (ed). 1994. Central Asia Reader. The Rediscovery Of History. New-York and 
London: M.E. Sharpe. Inc. 169. 
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"On Monday, June 4, 1990 Soviet troops, after days of sporadic clashes between 
Kirghiz and Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan's Osh Oblast, opened fire on a mob of Uzbeks 
throwing rocks and gasoline bombs. The group, which had separated from a 
protest crowd of reportedly 20,000 was angered by what they perceived was a 
Kirghiz SSR government policy of granting ethnic Kirghiz preferential access to 
scarce homesites in an 80-acre tract of land released by the republic for housing 
construction"121 . 
The problem of border demarcation between the republics remams unresolved 
especially in the Ferghana valley. As with the water problem, these problems were not 
so serious during Soviet power but with independence they have worsened. In 
February 1999 the Kyrgyz parliament deputies tried to raise the question of borders in 
the parliament. Dooronbek Sadyrbayev - a deputy - told his colleagues that Uzbek 
officials were shifting the border between the two countries in Uzbekistan's favour. In 
some places he said they were moving them as much as 24 kms from the position 
defined by the agreements between the two states122. 
12° Colson Charles. January 4, 1991. "Kirghizia: Political Stagnation Gives Way to Democratic 
Impulses". RFEIRL Report on the USSR. 31-32. In Elebaeva Aynur B. February 1992. "The Osh 
Incident: Problems For Research". Post-Soviet Geography. 33:78. 
121 June 7, 1990. New-York Times, Al, A8. In Elebaeva, Aynur B. February 1992. "The Osh 
Incident: Problems For Research". Post-Soviet Geography. 33:78. These conflicts (1989 Kyrgyz-
Tajik, Uzbek-Meschetian Turk, 1990 Kyrgyz-Uzbek and others which occurred in late Soviet period) 
can ·t be characterised as ethnic. The former member of Central Committee of Communist Party of 
Soviet Union A. Yakovlev argues that these conflicts were organised together by revenge forces in 
the centre and local clan-bolshevik structures. Yakovlev, Anatoliy. 1994. Gorkaya Chasha. 
!folshevizm I Reformatsiya v Rossii. 345. In Kosolapov, Nikolay. November 1995. Konflikty Post-
SO\·etskogo prostranstva: Politicheskiye Realii. Jurnal Mejdunarodnaya Ekonomika I 
.\feidunarodniye Otnosheniya. 11 :47. 
122 B. Pannier. "Border Dispute Between Uzbekistan And Kyrgyzstan Risks Triggering Conflict". 
RFE/RL, 8 March 1999 
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The problem is also complicated by the ongoing political crisis. After the attempt on 
the life of Uzbek President Islam Karimov in February 1999123, Uzbekistan declared 
that terrorists might have fled to Kyrgyz territory and blocked the borders 
completely124. Then after the August-September 1999 hostage crisis in the Ferghana 
valley part of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan started to demarcate the borders. Moreover, as 
from this year Uzbekistan enters a visa mode for the people from Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. And this, of course, will complicate trade in the valley. 
The Kyrgyz President Askar Askaev, according to Russian political scientist Valeriy 
Khlupin has confirmed that the problem of borders is very real and that there is in 
dispute territory (about 50 hectares) between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in which the 
Tajik side doesn't want to compromise125 . 
Uzbekistan unilaterally defined its frontiers with its neighbour in October 1999, which 
made Bishkek raise the border issue. Approximately 50 armed men penetrated deep 
123 On 16 February 1999, in what was apparently a coordinated attack aimed at killing Uzbekistan's 
President Karimov, six car bombs were detonated nearly simultaneously in the center of Tashkent. 
The first bomb went off outside the Interior Ministry building; troops were sealing off the site when 
a second car broke through the security cordon and head for the nearby government headquarters. 
Security opened fire, killing two bystanders, but the car's occupants escaped, and the vehicle 
subsequently exploded. The president's motorcade, while nearby, was unharmed. According to 
Uzbek press reports, four more diversionary bombs then went off damaging nearby sites, including 
the National Bank, a police station, and a site containing several foreign embassies. "Tashkent Car 
Bombing - Who and Why?". Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, 6 March, 1999 
124RFE!RL, 17 February 1999, News/ine 
125 Nikolay Fomin's interview with V. Khlupin. 2000. "Sovremennnyi Kyrgyzstan Glazami 
Rossiyskogo Nabludatelya" (Modem Kyrgyzstan in the eyes of Russian watcher), 25 April, 
http://\,·ww.curasia.org.ru/cgi-eurasia/r-test.pl?dialog 
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into the Kadamjaisky region of Kyrgyzstan and set up border fences. A similar 
incident took place in the Aravansky region126. At the beginning of this year the 
Kyrgyz government initiated border talks, which have only deepened the atmosphere 
of mistrust between the two countries. Unofficial statistics reveal that Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan are in dispute over hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. The latest 
round of border talks held in April this year ended in deadlock 
6.3. Environmental Issue. 
Environmental deterioration influences the Ferghana valley in two ways. Firstly sharp 
deterioration of the soil and water has economic consequences. Secondly, as in the 
Soviet times, the ecological problems are still relatively safety to express discontent 
against authorities: in other words they are a cover for other issues such as the local 
protest against the sharp decline of standard of living. 
The most significant example is the tragedy of the Aral Sea directly connected with 
the inflow into the sea of the rivers Syr-Daria (Naryn) and Amur-Darya which are 
mainly receiving water supply in the Ferghana Valley. The drying up of the Aral Sea 
has become a symbol of man's ravaging attitude towards natural resources and of the 
extensive and misdirected economic development in the south of the former Soviet 
1 : 6Sultan Jumagulov. 2000. "Border Dispute Threatens to Escalate". IWPR 's Reporting Central Asia, 
I 
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Union. This is a really big problem, which severely influence human health, causing 
sand and salt storms, water pollution and etc. 
The Aral Sea, once the fourth largest landlocked sea in the world (69,500 km2), has 
been reduced to two third of its previous volume and half its size. For centuries, the 
boundaries of this landlocked sea between three deserts - Kara Kum, K ysyl Kum and 
U stjurt - remained almost unchanged, with a fluctuation of about three meters in 
depth. In recent years especially in 1995-1996 the Syr-Darya rarely reached the sea. 
In the first half of 1993, the Syr Darya fed the Aral with 3.2 km3, whereas up to 2.5 
km3 ended in the collector lake of Arnasay. For the Aral, this water has been lost 
forever 127. 
High evaporation of about 58 km3 (a 90 cm water layer!) over the surface was 
equilibrated by small precipitation (156 mm/year) and surface or subsurface inflow. 
Although the sea has no outlet, the water was only slightly saline (1-1,4%)128. 
The sea's area, volume and salinity has fundamentally changed since the early 1960s. 
The Aral Sea has dropped by 16.5 meters in depth, shrinking by 56% and it has lost 
almost three-quarters of its volume, whereas salinity has multiplied to 30gll129. 
I , -
- Ekokuryer, 22. July 1993:3 
I '8 . 
- Precoda: Norman: 1991. "Reqmem for the Aral Sea", Alv!BJO, 3-4(20):109-110 
"9 
· - Prccoda: Norman: 1991. "Requiem for the Aral Sea", AMBJO, 3-4 (20): 109-1l0 
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The degradation of soils is closely connected with the exhaustion of water resources 
in Central Asia. Massive irrigation has led to large-scale salinisation due to saline 
irrigation water and water logging causing the rising of the ground water table. The 
excessive application of biocides - mainly due to a low immunity of cotton to diseases 
- and mineral fertilisers has poisoned much of the soil resources and polluted the 
drainage water flowing back to the rivers. The drying up of the Aral adds an ugly 
dimension in this respect; salts and toxic dust from the exposed sea bed contribute to 
the salinisation of soils in the adjacent agricultural regions of the Aral Sea. 
Another evident consequence of the Aral's shrinking is the change of the region's 
micro climate. As a barrier against cold winds from the north, the Aral Sea originally 
had a moderating function in the regional climate system and served as a catalyst for 
an enforced formation of clouds because of enormous masses of vapour rising from 
its surface. This moisture replenished the ice and snow caps of distant mountains, 
completing the region's water cycle. It is assumed that even the precipitation patterns 
in the mountains of Central Asia will change with a desiccated Aral Sea. The climate 
has become more continental with a shrinking water surface. Warmer summers, 
cooler winters and lowered humidity have caused a shortened growing season with 
heat-loving cotton cultivations that have been turned into rice paddies130. 
Millions of tons of salts and toxic chemicals transported by the rivers ended up in the 
Aral Sea as the last deposit of the region. But the sea has changed its role from a 
receiver to a chief supplier of salt. While shrinking, the Aral Sea has accumulated an 
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enormous quantity of salts. On the desertified sea bed area of about 36,000 km2, 
solontchak (white alkali soil) develops from which an estimated 75 million tons of 
toxic salt and dust - mainly sodium chloride and sodium sulphate - are deflated 
annually131 . This windbome salty dust - directly deposited or incorporated as aerosols 
in acid rain - is a serious danger to the plants and soils in the agricultural areas. In the 
Aral region, an average of over 500 kg of salts and sand fall annually on each hectare 
of the ecologically and agriculturally important delta of the Amu Darya. They further 
contaminate crops in the central provinces of Uzbekistan: Bukhara, Navoy and 
Samarkand. However, the saltstorms carry their toxic load far beyond the Aral region. 
Dust from the Aral has been found on the top of the Himalayas, in the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra rivers, and even in the Pacific and Arctic oceans as far as 10,000 km 
away. Experts think that these soluble salts will accelerate glacier thawing especially 
in the Pamir mountains ultimately, melting the stock of the Amu Darya, the most 
. fC l A . 132 important waterway o entra s1a . 
The F erghana valley is directly affected by the disaster of the Aral sea. It influences 
agriculture and human health in the valley. Every one of the Central Asian states must 
reduce water consumption in order to increase inflow into the Aral Sea this affects the 
agriculture of the region. Moreover it has direct economic consequences for every of 
13° Critchlow, James. 1991. Nationalism in Uzbekistan. San Fransisco: Westview Press : 81 
ui Precoda: Nonnan:l991. "Requiem for the Aral Sea", AMBIO, 3-4 (20):113 
i•:: Precoda: Norman:l991. "Requiem for the Aral Sea", AMBIO, 3-4 (20):111 
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five states are obliged to transfer one per cent of its GNP to the "Save Aral" 
~ d . 133 ioun at1on . 
133 Jalling, Lasse. "Water Management in Central Asia". 1998. NIASnytt, 3 
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CHAPTER VII. Geopolitics. 
Stability in the Central Asian region in the coming years will depend in some cases on 
the other states' policy and first of all on the policy of the Russian Federation. The 
whole Central Asian region can be characterised as unstable and an area where 
conflicts can erupt at any time. Moreover, it is not so difficult to destabilise the 
situation and in fact even relatively weak forces outside the region can do so by 
supporting any aggressive forces within the region. On the other hand, especially after 
the end of Tajik civil war (at least there is no armed combat), geostrategic plans for 
the transportation of natural resources to the world market make most of the players 
in the region interested in supporting stability in Central Asia, including the Ferghana 
valley. 
The existence of instability spots in the region is complicated by the existence such 
conflict zones outside the region. In the West it is the Caucasus conflict zone, 
characterised not only by present armed conflicts but also by numerous potential 
instabilities; in the South it is periodical conflicts in Kurdistan, the Persian Gulf and a 
permanent one in the whole territory of Afghanistan. 
There is still permanent tension between Pakistan and India. Potential conflict can 
take place in the West of China (East Turkestan). In certain conditions every one of 
these instabilities can transformed into armed conflict. Moreover, each of these states 
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has an ethnic minority problem which can destabilise the situation for many years to 
come. 
7 .1. RUSSIAN FACTOR. 
Despite attempts of the regional states to distance themselves economically, 
politically and culturally from Russia this state continue to retain its influence in the 
region. Although Russia is too weak to reconquer the region, it is strong enough to 
threaten its stability. Even with new pipelines, Russia will retain considerable control 
over Central Asia's natural-resource exports134. Despite any difficulties and problems 
the Russian military remains a force to be reckoned with. 
Any conflict or instability in the region which can develop confronts Russia with a 
choice: either to try to stabilise the situation or immediately to quit the conflict-ridden 
area. This choice is complicated by the fact that it does not have its own fortified 
borders, to which it could withdraw its armed forces and reliably protect itself from 
the violence, narcotics and arms being exported from the zone of instability. 
It must be admitted that the danger of Russia's efforts to stabilise the situation by 
turning into an instrument for the support of one regime or another is already 
apparent. In any case, the greatest threat of military commitments turning into 
political sphere lies in unilateral guarantees and measures, should the Russian 
leadership find it necessary to resort to them. 
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According to the January 1993 "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation" adopted by Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the November 1993 "Basic 
Provisions of the Military Doctrine", adopted by the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation, its immediate periphery, that is the former USSR, was declared as a zone 
of vital interests to be secured 135 . 
Russia simultaneously launched a diplomatic campaign aimed at the legitimisation of 
the Russian military presence and peacekeeping activities in the CIS 136 . Russia is 
claiming "special responsibility and authority for the former Soviet Republics (a new 
version of the Monroe Doctrine)" with recognition of its claims by the West and 
sanctioned by the UN137. 
But Russia's problem is that it is much weaker than the Soviet Union and traditional 
Soviet diplomatic and military methods don't help its foreign policy. Russia explores 
its connection with some people and groups abroad to implement problems. Russia's 
"antiterrorist operation" in Chechnya can destabilise the situation in the Caucasus. In 
an interview with "Frankfurter Algemainer Zeitung" the American political scientist 
and former National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinsky called the Russian action in the 
Chechnya an attempt to destabilise the situation in the whole Caucasus region. 
131 Suyunbaev and Mamytova. 1998. "Natural Resources as a Factor of Development of Central 
Asia". Central Asia and Caucasus, 1 
135 Duygu Sezer. 1996_ "Russia and the South: Central Asia and Southern Caucasus". European 
Securi~v, 2 (5):304. 
136 Duygu Sezer. 1996. "Russia and the South: Central Asia and Southern Caucasus". European 
.'>'ecurity, 2 (5):305 
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According to him it will lead to isolation of these states and Central Asian states from 
the world. It will jeopardise their efforts to integrate into the world economy and 
push them into the Russian orbit138. 
The election of former KGB boss Vladimir Putin to Russia's presidency breeds fear 
among Central Asian leaders. Putin has already made it clear that Russia is ready to 
reintegrate the FSU republics as much as it suits its interests139. In Central Asia, 
conspiracy theories abound that Chechen rebels, as well as "Wahhabi" terrorists are 
receiving their training first in Moscow and then in the Middle East140. Many believe 
that Moscow is using these fighters to destabilise the republics on the periphery in 
order to justify future military incursions in the region. Putin's current and bloody 
campaign in the Caucasus has caused a palpable fear in the Soviet successor states in 
the southern tier (see appendices, table 2). 
137 Alexei Arbatov. 1993. "Russian Foreign Policy Alternatives". Int. Security, 18/2:29-30. 
138 Trina Lagunina. An interview with Z. Brzezinsky. RFE/RL, 13 November 1999. 
J.' 9 Nikolay Fomin. "Nazarbayev Ne Priehal Na Inaguratsiyu" (Nazarbaev Didn't Attend 
Inauguration). Tsentral 'no Aziatskiy Bulleten '. 12 May 2000. 
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7.2. Uzbek Regional Hegemony Ambitions. 
Uzbekistan with a population of 23 .4 million (as of January 1997), is the largest state 
in the Central Asia141 . It alone shares borders with all Central Asian states and has 
significant diasporas in each of them (see appendices, table 3). Unlike Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, which have multinational population, Uzbekistan has a relatively 
homogeneous population. This country has the region's largest and best-trained 
armed forces, well-developed industries, an extensive network of research institutes 
and higher educational establishments, and a large intelegensia. It also contains the 
historical cities of Bukhara and Samarkand within its borders. 
Uzbekistan has had periodic disagreements with its neighbours over the allocation of 
water resources and payments for gas oil shipments. The withholding of gas deliveries 
by Tashkent due to non-payments has led to shortages in parts of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are in many respects natural rivals, competing for both 
the role of regional leader and the attention of foreign investors. The tightening by 
Kazakstan authorities of the customs regime on its border with Uzbekistan and the 
recent border demarcation by Uzbekistan and its intention to introduce visa regime 
are also reported to have created tensions between the two central Asian leaders142. 
110 Beatrice Hagan. 2000."What Is the Meaning of Democracy in Central Asia?". Central Asia and 
Caucasus Analyses. 1 March 
111 Human Development Report: Uzbekistan 1997, Tashkent, UNDP:52 
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Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations have been strained by fears among Kyrgyzstan leaders that 
Tashkent may take too great an interest in Bishkek's affairs. These concerns have 
been exacerbated by Karimov' s displays of strengths in their region, such as the 
holding of military exercises in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 1993 
without prior permission of Kyrgyzstan. 143 Tensions rose to the surface in the summer 
of 1996 when the governor of Osh region, where a large Uzbek diaspora lives, 
accused Tashkent of harbouring claims to the territory of Kyrgyzstan and 
strenthening its military position in the Ferghana Valley. 144 
In 1995 Tajikistan officials accused Uzbekistan of stealing wheat intended for 
Tajikistan145, and Tajik-Uzbek relations deteriorated sharply after the Khojand events 
in November 1998, when about 1000 armed people under the command of Colonel 
Khudaberdiyev entered the Ferghana Valley of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan and tried 
to make a state coup. Addressing the Tajik parliament on 12 November, President 
Imomali Rakhmonov said he had proof that his Uzbek counterpart, Islam Karimov, 
had rendered assistance to former Tajik Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdollojonov, 
whom Rakhmonov identified as the mastermind behind the failed rebellion. "By 
organising coups and helping rebels, the Uzbek leadership wants to bring the whole of 
142 Islam Karimov Serditsya (Islam Karimov is angry). Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 22.04.98. Tatyana 
Koratskaya. "Uzbeki Tiho Delyat Granitsy, Soglasno Svoim Kartam"(Uzbeks divide the border 
silently according to their maps). AIF-K.azakstan, 3.02.2000. 
143 Olcott., Martha Brill. 1996. Central Asia's New States. Washington, United States Institute of 
Peace Press: 107 
1 
·
14 
"Khronika Odnoi Rotatsii" (Chronicle Of One Retirement). Slovo Kyrgyzstna, 30-31.07.1996. 
The controversial governor ofOsh region, Janysh Rustenbekov, was removed by a presidential 
decree in july 1996. 
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Tajikistan under its control" said Imomali Rakhmonov146. Tajik Prosecutor-General 
Salomiddin Sharapov condemned Uzbekistan's alleged complicity in the revolt as 
11 armed intervention 11 and claimed that the rebels had undergone training m 
AC. h • 147 rug amstan . 
Since independence Uzbekistan has pursued a distinctive and assertive regional 
policy. Until the Taliban successes in Afghanistan and the rapprochement in Tajikistan 
this policy had been relatively successful. 
Uzbekistan and Russia have a relationship in which competition for regional influence 
and common national objectives often run in tandem. Afghanistan and Tajikistan are 
the most evident arenas in which this relationship is being conducted. 
Neighbouring Central Asian states have commented, with some concern, on 
Uzbekistan's alleged regional ambitions148. The Uzbekistani government, much to the 
consternation of the other four Central Asian republics, is not afraid to herald its view 
of itself as the regional leader. Alimov is keen to promote the official view that 
Uzbekistan is a prime regional actor, declaring that, "there is little reason to believe 
that any of these countries (Kasakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) could anchor 
115 RFE/RL 12 May 1998, Newsline 
116 RFE/RL 13 November 1998, Newsline 
1 
·
17 RFE/RL 13 November 1998, Newsline 
118 These echo similar historical apprehensions of Uzbek hegemony. 
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the region's stability, resist pressures from without or mobilise political and economic 
resources needed to resist chaos"149. 
Now Islamic fundamentalism is viewed as the main threat to stability in the Central 
Asian region. But this threat is perhaps, "more of an imagined threat"150. Tashkent 
has used the imagined Islamic treat as an excuse for its authoritarian politics internally 
and territorial consolidation externally. Tashkent's border initiatives are ostensibly 
aimed at securing its territory against Islamic infiltration but they are seen as evidence 
of an Uzbek hegemonic mind-set in other Central Asian republics. They are fears that 
Tashkent may feel justified in expanding its borders. This is likely "to adversely affect 
inter-ethnic relations as Uzbekistan's neighbours would view their Uzbek minorities 
as a liability - a fifth column" 151 . More serious than the imagined Islamic peril, 
therefore, Uzbekistan's policies pose a challenge to regional stabfuty. 
\ 
\ 
149 K. Alimov. 1995. "Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy: in Search of Strategy". In Sagdeev and 
Eisenhower, eds. Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change. Chevy Chase: 187 
: s<. Shahram Akbarzadeh. "2000. Is Islam Threat to Stability in Central Asia" Central Asia and 
Caucasus Analyses, 1 March 
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Conclusion. 
After the disintegration of the USSR few experts predicted that the Central Asian 
states could survive. Many of them noted that these states had no experience of 
independence, that they were not nation-states in the classical sense and warned that 
conflicts would occur all over the huge region. It was believed that most of them 
couldn't preserve their independence and would disintegrate (especially Kazakstan). 
Now after years of independence we can be more optimistic about the future of the 
region; at least we can say that the states haven't turned to permanent bloody 
conflicts except for the civil war in Tajikistan. 
These countries' fortunes will depend most of all on what they can do for themselves. 
Optimists construct rosy scenarios in which the countries with the biggest resources -
Kazakstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan - use their mineral wealth to speed up 
economic development. With flexible and efficient markets, they should be able to 
build economies based more broadly than just on oil or gas. Through careful 
investment in infrastructure and education the riches could be widely spread. 
Uzbekistan could abandon its introversion and become the economic hub of Central 
Asia with a large domestic market and a diverse export base. 
But a darker scenario of wasted resources, economic stagnation and ethnic strife is 
equally possible. Moreover, regional regimes are becoming more authoritarian while 
corruption and cronyism are rife. Unchallenged, these weaknesses will prevent the 
region from fulfilling its promise. Its development will be slowed as foreign investors 
151 Shahram Akbarzadeh. "2000. Is Islam Threat to Stability in Central Asia" Central Asia and 
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stay away. Its integration will grind to a halt and falling economies will fuel ethnic 
animosities. Today's fragile stability could quickly dissolve into violent chaos. 
The Ferghana Valley, a densely populated, volatile zone spannmg Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is already experiencing severe conflict. Many of the 
region's problems stem from two conflicting Soviet legacies - one of division and the 
other of unity. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and division of the Central Asia 
into independent states has harmed the Valley by dividing up a natural economic and 
social area into three different countries. On the other hand the Soviets installed 
artificial boundaries in the region to create five states. The borders, however, were 
administrative rather than political or economic. The region's infrastructure and 
economy was based on a single unit, such that the Central Asian states provided raw 
materials to feed factories in Russia and Ukraine. Understanding the region's 
infrastructure and economy - roads, rails, and water networks - is crucial to 
comprehend its current problems. For example, the main road from Tashkent , the 
Uzbek capital, to the Ferghana Valley crosses Northern Tajikistan. As Uzbekistan 
continues to build more border controls the tensions will likely mount. This has 
already raised the land disputes and tensions on the borders. 
The problem of regionalism, religion, drug trafficking, cnme, environment, water, 
land and so on in the Ferghana Valley are destabilising the situation in the region. 
Taking into consideration the sharp decline of standard of living in the region one can 
predict that these factors may lead to social, political and ethnic turmoil on a scale 
('rwcasus Analyses, 1 March 
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surpassing the present conflict in Tajikistan. The late-developing states as in the case 
of Central Asia can easily turn into chaos failing to satisfy the population's demand. 
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APPENDICES 
Table 1. Factors destabilising ethnic relations in the Southern Kyrgyzstan 
(over 5%). 
Osh district % Jalal-Abad district % 
Unemployment 66.8 Unemployment 54.8 
Falling living standards 40.9 Wrong personnel policy 30.7 
Rise in Crime 32.8 Rise in Crime 30.1 
Shortage of food and water 23.5 Activity of nationalist 30.1 
movements 
Wrong personnel policy 20.1 Customs abuses 29.5 
Activity of religious groups 15.9 Insufficient attention to the 26.5 
state languages 
Activity of nationalist 14.4 Rise in crime 23.2 
movements 
Insufficient attention to 13.8 Shortage of food and water 15.4 
languages and customs 
Customs abuses 12.4 Territorial claims and 12.7 
disputes with neighbouring 
countries 
Increase in number of 10.0 Activity of religious groups 7.2 
refugees 
Territorial claims and 8.1 Difficult to say 6.6 
disputes with neighbouring 
countries 
Mass media 7.5 
Insufficient attention to the 6.6 
state language 
Source: Ta6:i.IDI3JIHeBa, AHapa; A.mmleBa, An.ipK)'m.; lliYKYPOB, 3MHJIL. 2000. CoUHam.Hhle peamm 
JO)l(HOro K:i.ipr:i.oCTaHa. EHIDKex: HHcnnyr PemoHam.HLIX Hccne.n:osamtii 
Note: Face-to-face interviews were conducted from 25 February till 5 March 1998 in Osh and Ja/al-
Abad oblasts of the Kyrgyz Republic. 1000 respondents were interviewed. 
Table 2. Central Asia and Russia. Power indices. 
Country Population GNP (US $ billion) Area (thouz. sq. Armed Forces 
km.) 
Russia 148 1,100 17,075 1.24 m 
Kyrgyzstan 4.5 2.1 199 12,200 
Tajikistan 5.8 1.1 143 9,000 
Uzbekistan 22.6 11.0 447 70,000 
Source: Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt. The limits of neorealism: understanding secutiry in 
Central Asia. Review oflntemational Studies,# 25, 1999: 90 
Note: Population figures are for 1989 and have been rounded; GNP and armed forces data are for 
1996. 
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Table 3. Distribution of Uzbek within Central Asia (1989). 
Country Number Percentage of Country's Population 
Uzbekistan 14,123,626 71.3 
Kazakstan 332,016 2.0 
Kyrgyzstan 550,095 12.9 
Turkmenistan 317,252 9.0 
Taiikistan 1,197,091 23.5 
Total 16,520,080 
Source: Annette Bohr. Uzbekistan Politics And Foreign Policy. The Royal Institute Of International 
Affairs, 1998, p. 50. 
Figure 1. Corruption index*. 
0 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
*Assessment of corruption by a panel of regional analysts; 
most corrupted = 9, least corrupted = 0 
9 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Cited in "The Economist", February 7, 
1998. Central Asia Survey: 15 
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